Innovation in StatoilHydro : a case study of knowledge development in a large Norwegian company by Kallåk, Mari Kristine
 U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  O S L O  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES                                                TIK 
Centre for technology,  
innovation and culture P.O. BOX 1108 Blindern 
N-0317 OSLO 
Norway 
http://www.t
ik.uio.no 
 
 
TIK-MA-THESIS 
Innovation in StatoilHydro 
– a case study of knowledge development in a large Norwegian 
company 
 
Mari Kristine Kallåk 
 
2007-2009 
 
Word count: 27 946 
 II 
 III 
Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to provide insights as to how innovation may be influenced by 
knowledge and learning. This is done through assessing what drivers of innovation 
StatoilHydro is operating under, and how the company develop and use knowledge under 
these conditions. The oil and gas industry is subject to specific conditions related to market 
and regulations, which calls for the development of particular competencies related to 
knowledge. Development and use of knowledge is crucial to meet innovation-challenges, and 
does not follow some automatic pattern. In order to increase the understanding of how 
innovation comes about in StatoilHydro, I have applied an analytical framework which 
situates StatoilHydro in its larger sectoral and technological context, and considers different 
modes of learning and innovation. In addition to this I have also applied literature on 
organizational practices related to learning and knowledge. The main emphasis of this thesis 
is on different practices which are seen to enhance the development of knowledge and 
consequently, innovation. 
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 1.0 Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to increase the understanding of how knowledge and learning 
takes place in large companies, in the context of innovation activity. Organizations are faced 
with changing environments in which opportunities to innovate are affected by this change as 
well as the companies own efforts towards handling change and learn from it. Knowledge 
development and learning is important for innovation, but there are many approaches to this 
depending on size and objective of a company, as well as the initial internal composition of 
knowledge and expertise. One way of making processes of knowledge development explicit is 
to view them as two complementary modes of learning and innovation (Jensen et al 2007). 
Processes of innovation have traditionally been viewed as relatively linear and tidy 
occurrences which are fuelled by basic research. Basic research has thus been valued as the 
critical source of innovation, and policies aimed at enhancing innovation has correspondingly 
emphasized the strengthening of basic research. However, analyses of empirical evidence has 
suggested that this is a skewed view of how innovation come about, and that the processes in 
reality are far more complex and dynamic than what is described in the linear view and 
encompass different types of knowledge that is brought about in different ways. This 
alternative understanding has implications for the shaping of innovation policy, as well as the 
learning strategies for innovating companies. 
 
1.1 Approach 
In order to provide empirical data for analysis, I have chosen to do an explorative case study. 
The empirical field is two research centres, within StatoilHydro. 
1.1.1 StatoilHydro 
StatoilHydro is a Norwegian energy company with approximately 29 500 employees in 40 
countries. It operates 39 active oil- and gas fields, and produces more than 1.7 million barrels 
oil equivalent every day. The company is world-leading in carbon capture and storage (CCS), 
and the largest operator in waters more than 100 metres deep. There are six business areas; 
Exploration and Production Norway, International Exploration and Production, Natural Gas, 
Manufacturing and Marketing, Projects, and Technology and New Energy. The research 
centres are located under the Technology and New Energy area (statoilhydro.com). Both 
centres participating in this study are relatively autonomous, in the sense that they may choose 
 2 
their own strategies of research and innovation within company policies. In addition to this 
they participate in collaboration with the other centres, and with other actors internal and 
external to the StatoilHydro system. When working on projects, they apply a matrix 
organization, meaning that people are assigned from different departments and put together to 
solve tasks.  
Statoil and Norsk Hydro Oil and Gas merged and became StatoilHydro on the 1st of October 
2007. There are now three distinct research centres in the StatoilHydro system, and several 
other research facilities. Prior to the merger, two of the research centres were part of Hydro, 
and the third was part of Statoil. The two selected research centres are located in Porsgrunn 
(RCP), and Trondheim (RCT), originally ex-Hydro and ex-Statoil respectively 
(statoilhydro.com). Given the short amount of time since the merger (at the time of data 
collection approximately 1 year), it can not be expected that the company is integrated on all 
levels and areas. However, selecting centres from both ex-companies will most likely give a 
broader and more balanced empirical base for analysis. In the analysis, no emphasis will be 
made on the origin of the centres. They will be treated as equal representatives of innovation 
activity in StatoilHydro. 
I have applied a case-study approach, and conducted interviews, documentary analysis and 
observation. Of the interviews, five are in-depth interviews with people of different positions 
in the research-organisation in StatoilHydro. The other five are more informal conversations 
with innovators, about specific cases of innovation-projects. In addition to this, I have 
observed an arena for exchange of challenges and ideas. I wanted to talk with people who 
have different positions and thus different experiences with innovation in StatoilHydro, in 
order to gain a broad understanding of the innovation activity. Further, relevant documents 
has been read and analysed. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
In order to increase the understanding of how development of knowledge and learning takes 
place in large companies in the context of innovation activity, the following research 
questions are asked: 
What drivers of innovation is StatoilHydro operating under, and what kind of needs 
for knowledge development follows of these? 
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And furthermore: 
How is the firm organizing its knowledge development and use under these 
conditions? 
 
1.3 Main sources of influence 
Research institutes in Norway and abroad have contributed heavily to research on innovation 
activity in business and industry. Growth, Innovation and Policy (GIPOL) is a collaboration 
project between the Norwegian research institute NIFU STEP, Norwegian School of 
Management, University of Agder, and the Swedish University of Lund. It is funded by the 
Norwegian Research Council, and lasts from 2007-2010. The aim of the project is to “(…) 
analyze modes of innovation and knowledge networks in order to develop an 
analytical framework adapted to the increasing globalization of the economy. Within this 
framework, innovation processes in firms and in different regional contexts will be analyzed” 
(GIPOL 2009). The project also aims to discuss how the new understanding might have 
implications for the development of national innovation policy. Especially Work Package 1 of 
the project considers innovation processes in companies. The project Nordic Innovation 
Indicators (NIND), lasting from 2006 -2008 has also been important in developing an 
understanding of innovation in the Nordic countries. 
In addition to this, analyses, reports and articles have been issued by other institutional actors. 
Among these we find the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), and the Norwegian Research Council with different reports (www.oecd.com, 
www.nfr.no). The perspectives in these works are predominantly systemic, sectorial or 
regional, and make extensive use of quantitative data. 
The Danish DISKO survey (1996-1999) aimed at achieving a better understanding of 
relations between Danish economy, competence-building and innovation 
(http://www.business.auc.dk/disko). I refer to results from the DISKO project in this paper. 
Another relevant research project is the Canadian survey named Managing Innovation in the 
New Economy (MINE), which comes out of the Ecolé Polytechnique Montreal 
(http://www.minesurvey.polymtl.ca/). This project takes a closer look at each firm 
participating in the survey; the data being applied is standardised and quantitative. I make use 
of some topics and perspectives from the MINE-survey in this paper. 
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There has been done extensive research on organisational knowledge and innovation. The 
Danish DISKO survey has been used as empirical basis in an analysis conducted by Jensen et 
al. (2007). An article stemming from this work considers different types of knowledge in 
relation to innovative performance. It also puts emphasis on the view that innovation surveys 
and approaches to innovative processes in many cases seem to be biased, favoring science and 
technology as important knowledge bases and neglecting forms of knowledge stemming from 
experience, skill and know-how. The Jensen et al. (2007) article provides part of the 
theoretical framework for this paper, and will be dealt with on a more detailed level later on in 
this paper. I will also make use of theoretical perspectives concerning organisational design 
and innovation, and high performance work systems. Also of interest in this paper is the 
development of the oil- and gas industry in Norway, which will I will briefly account for in 
section three about the history and contemporary context of innovation and the oil- and gas 
industry. 
I have chosen to write about knowledge development in relation to innovative activity within 
one major company in the oil- and gas industry. This means that I am examining one specific 
case of innovative activity using qualitative empirical data, in contrast to the aforementioned 
projects in which the scope is systemic, sectoral, or regional and the empirical data are 
predominantly quantitative. This is not a paper about indicators of innovation. Neither is it 
about sectoral or regional characteristics of innovative activity, or on the importance of 
innovation for economic growth. These topics are however relevant to the study in the sense 
that they to some extent describe the broader environment in which a company has to operate. 
I will not consider innovation systems in relation to StatoilHydro, as the scope of the study is 
relatively limited. Innovation systems on local, regional, national and global levels are 
however of current interest in national and international research. Knowledge development is 
relevant on all these levels, and its consequences may be read economically and politically. 
There are a lot of research on innovative activity and knowledge on systemic, sectoral and 
regional levels, but not so much on company level in terms of knowledge and innovative 
performance. One big question is how improved innovative performance may affect society 
economically. This paper does however not consider questions related to economic growth in 
national economies, or on any other level. 
Also relevant to the topic of knowledge development and innovation systems is the 
relationship between the educational system, the R&D sector, and business. Knowledge is 
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obviously a major factor in the relationship. Put very simply, the educational system provides 
competence to R&D and business, R&D provides basic and applied research, and business 
provides economic incentives for further education and R&D. This paper does not elaborate 
on issues regarding this relationship; but it will consider the linkages between StatoilHydro’s 
innovative activity and internal and external actors, in so far they are relevant to the internal 
organisation of development and use of knowledge. 
The difference between the research presented in this paper, and research done within the 
context of the aforementioned projects and institutions, is thus; that my study is done on 
company level, within one firm, and makes use of qualitative empirical data. Further, I 
attempt to describe factors which influence and condition development and use of knowledge 
on company level. To the extent such research has been done, it has predominantly made use 
of surveys. I am using qualitative interviews and observation to achieve a thorough 
understanding of a limited empirical field. 
 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis aims to answer the research questions stated above. Chapter one provides a general 
overview of topic, methods and context. The second chapter provides an account of 
innovation as concept and some history on innovation, an account of the start and 
development of the Norwegian oil and gas industry, and a brief walkthrough of the White 
Paper o Innovation 2008-2009.  
Chapter Three presents the analytical concepts of environment conditions and structural 
archetypes, and modes of learning and innovation. 
Chapter four provides an account of the research design and methods, and the validity and 
reliability of this study. 
Chapters five and six present the empirical findings and discuss these in light of the analytical 
framework. 
Chapter seven summarizes main findings and propositions based on the analysis in chapters 
five and six, and some views on what implications this might have for StatoilHydro, future 
innovation policy, and further research. 
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2.0 Background 
In this section I will account for innovation as concept, the general historical setting of 
innovation, and some views on innovation processes. The organization of R&D and the role 
of the Researcher have changed quite a lot through the course of history.  In addition to this, I 
will provide an overview of the history of the oil- and gas industry in Norway. I believe that 
to be better equipped in understanding the challenges of innovation in the industry today, it is 
important to have some knowledge of the historical context of innovation as well as the 
industry-specific development. Norwegian oil- and gas industry has been subject to various 
regulations and control mechanisms. It has also been characterized by a high degree of state 
ownership, and attempts by the government to organize and provide incentives for certain 
ways of doing R&D. This historical context might give some useful insights as to how the 
situation of today has come about. The last section provides an account of the White Paper on 
Innovation 2008-2009, and how this may be seen in relation to StatoilHydro’s activities. 
 
2.1 Innovation 
The history of innovation is in many ways as long as the history of Man. Humans has always 
tried to find ways of doing things easier, more efficient, and producing more at a better 
quality. The following provides a definition of innovation. This provides insights as to how 
innovation may be understood in the context of StatoilHydro 
 
2.1.1 Innovation as concept 
Defining innovation as a concept is not easily done. It definitively relates to something that is 
new, but what is this something, and how is it new? Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) 
described innovation as creative destruction, implying that an innovation may destroy the old, 
in a way the benefits the society. Joel Mokyr coined the term history’s free lunches, indicating 
that innovations may make it possible to harvest profits which have not been available with 
the old technology. Innovation as something new may be contextually divided; new to the 
world are big innovations which achieve a broad diffusion; new to society are innovations 
which a society has not known of earlier, but it may exist in other societies; new to the 
company or the local community refers to the implementation of something that appears as 
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new in a local context but is diffused elsewhere. Diffusion is thus another important concept; 
an innovation is not an innovation before it has been put to use. (Godø 2008) 
It is important to note that innovation is not the same as invention. An invention is an idea of a 
new technical construction, a process, a material or service, and some documentation that this 
would work as intended. An innovation may be built on an invention, and is thus the actual 
realization of an idea. Innovations may be characterized by their potential to change their 
surroundings. An incremental innovation imposes only small changes on processes or 
products. Radical innovations may significantly change products, processes or economic 
sectors. Further, some innovations may change technological systems, bringing about new 
economic sectors or business types. Lastly, some innovations may change the techno-
economic paradigm, changes which are brought about by several radical innovations which 
influence the organization of a society. The Industrial Revolution is an example of the latter 
type of innovation. (Godø 2008) However, the processes of turning ideas and knowledge into 
innovation have been much disputed. Innovations and the processes by which they come 
about are in a sense a black box which needs to be opened up. Examining the elements and 
dynamics prior to the wide diffusion of an innovation is an important practice in order to 
understand these processes, and thus being able to make improvements. (Latour & Wolgar 
1986) 
The following section will draw some general lines in Western innovation history and the 
perception of the Researcher, from the early beginnings in the 18th Century and onwards. 
 
2.1.2 The History of Innovation 
One popular view of the researcher, especially in old times, is the notion that he (or she)1 is an 
extraordinary individual. Great innovations have come about because the person behind it is 
perceived to be a genius and possesses unusual talents, and is often thought of as a distinct 
entrepreneurial type. Marie Curie, Thomas Edison, James Watt, and the Norwegian Kristian 
Birkeland are examples of famous inventors and scientists that have been given status as 
extraordinary individuals. The admiration of these heroes was probably a result of the cultural 
and economic situation of the times, when nationalism was strong and there was a thirst for 
                                                 
1
 Extraordinary individuals have been men and women; however, this view on researchers was prevailent in the 
late 19th century and early 20th century, when men dominated science and technology development. (Godø 2008) 
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national heroes who could represent excellence and ambition. Some common characteristics 
of the extraordinary individuals are high intelligence, creativity, dedication of time and effort 
to their work, often a suffering social or family life because of the time and energy spent on 
the research, and special social and political skills which are helpful in convincing funders. 
This view on the Researcher is however of limited application. It disregards that these 
extraordinary individuals usually draw in work from several people around them, without 
which they would never be able to do their work. Society’s need for heroes, particularly in the 
19th century, meant that some men were glorified and mythologized as almost superhuman. 
However, some men have contributed heavily to technological development and not been 
credited, while others gave only small contributions but received most of the credit for it. The 
important point here is that the emphasis is on people and heroes, which leaves the process of 
innovation in a haze. Inventions are mixed with innovations, and all the people, organizations 
and businesses are left out of the equation (Godø 2008:46-49). An important element in this 
thesis is to open up the innovation processes in order to gain insights as to how people, 
organizations and businesses work together and develop knowledge which is essential to 
innovation in StatoilHydro. 
The Industrial Revolution brought with it radical changes in production and social 
organisation. New technology and processes made it possible to save resources, produce more 
efficiently, and to employ less people. The pace of technological innovation was relatively 
slow in the early industrialisation, but picked up the pace after some time. In Great Britain, 
innovation was characterized by learning by doing, relying on skill and knowledge of the 
industry. Skilled workers developed technical solutions to known problems in the industry 
due to extensive practical knowledge of the problems and a process of trial and error. Some 
people made a living out of creating patentable inventions. Science was modestly developed 
and concentrated on areas with little or none industrial application; for instance astronomy, 
magnetism, crystallography etc. Some science was picked up by industry, but this was older 
in nature and associated with the Scientific Revolution; examples include chlorine for 
bleaching. Industry and technology was most likely a source of development in science, and 
not the other way around. The level of formal education was generally low and did not 
improve substantially during the Industrial Revolution. It is believed that this is a possible 
reason for the shift from worker-led innovation, to managers or owners to lead innovation. 
This in turn probably narrowed the scope for maintaining advance (von Tunzelmann 
1995:117-127). A major point in this thesis is how knowledge developed through learning by 
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doing and knowledge stemming from formal education may work together to enhance 
innovation. 
Though Great Britain was leading in innovation in the early industrialization period, the rest 
of Europe followed in the period of late 19th and early 20th century. Industrialists on the 
European continent had been travelling to Britain to observe the technologies and processes 
applied by the British, but lacked an appropriate knowledge base to accommodate 
technologies and processes to local conditions. However, British innovators and workmen 
moved to the Continent and brought knowledge of how to build and operate the machinery. 
These were to a varying degree successful. A reason for this may be that they were not aware 
of why they had been successful back home, and tried to copy the technology and processes 
without regard to the tacit knowledge needed to operate known equipment in unknown 
surroundings. Adjusting to local environments was the key to success. The growing 
complexity of machinery called for new kinds of skills. Germany and France sustained 
relatively different educational systems. France upheld a rather elitist educational system, 
whereas Germany provided a more practical curriculum in secondary school, and a tertiary 
education in universities with pure science or applied science. In addition, this was combined 
with vocational training within some large firms at the end of the 19th century. Germany was 
not as proficient as France and Britain in scientific theory, but nevertheless found itself at the 
forefront of organization of science in the early 20th century. Technical training below 
research level in the form of polytechnics and mechanic’s institutes was set up by the 
government, and German engineers-to-be had relatively high exposure to large companies in 
German industry. In France and Germany, industrial research laboratories were set up from 
the 1850’s, often with strong links to academia. France tended to recruit individual scientists 
to positions in firms, whereas Germany set up research teams and divided problems for 
teamwork; in effect they introduced a division of labour in R&D. In-house R&D was most 
likely to be set up in large firms, due to scope and scale. This permitted rapid 
commercialization of products (von Tunzelmann 1995:161-169). The importance of tacit 
knowledge and the combination of such with formal education and skill based knowledge is 
essential to the innovation processes which are analyzed in this thesis. 
In the period of late 19th century to early 20th, the US borrowed or copied technologies from 
abroad. They had to accommodate the technology to local context, especially considering that 
the US has a quite different terrain and natural resources. They lead ahead in technological 
systems, such as power-supply, which had to be organised differently because of the vast 
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areas and scattered urban areas. For a long time development was a result of trial and error, 
but around the turn of the century, more formal R&D begun to emerge. Metallurgy, food 
processing and construction required better information, and laboratories were involved in 
relative routine tasks like testing and grading materials, assaying minerals, controlling quality 
and writing specifications. However, trial and error was for a large part still normal 
procedure; for instance by Thomas Edison in his laboratory at Menlo Park. Larger firms 
increasingly established in-house R&D, as this was seen to be more able in combining various 
inputs and firm-specific knowledge. R&D came to have two faces, as firms were combining 
in-house research with external technology. There was a continuing tension among scientists 
in these in-house R&D labs between a desire to do pure science, and the firm’s need for 
patents (von Tunzelmann 1995:194-202). The analysis in this thesis considers the linkages 
between in-house R&D and external technology in relation to knowledge development and 
effects on innovative performance. 
By the early 20th century, the US was leading in industrial productivity, primarily because of 
superior organization of production and competencies in marketing. The US operations in 
wartime became significant for the rest of the world. The US found itself in a position to 
rebuild the world economy, by which measures like the Marshall Plan (1948) was put to 
work. The Iron Curtain came down at the same time, dividing the East and the West. In this 
period, the role of formal R&D rose, whereas the importance of individual inventors 
decreased. In-house R&D got more and more oriented towards handling complexity and 
idiosyncrasy of technology in the firm, while contracted-out R&D was used for routine 
investigation and standardization. This complementary relationship of R&D is similar to the 
two faces perspective noted above. In-house R&D departments were separated from 
production to be able to take on long-term perspectives. In addition, it was acknowledged that 
to be able to interpret and benefit from other firms’ R&D, it was important to do own research 
in that area. Another reason was that it became common in some industries to pool patents, 
and to be able to take part in this pool, conducting own R&D and sharing patents was a 
condition. Such industries usually consist of large firms, and are described as Schumpeter 
Mark II. This is characterized by creative accumulation where barriers to new entrants are 
high due to the complexity of technology, long-term cumulativeness of knowledge and 
consequently low degree of externalities in a given industry. The contrasting Schumpeter 
Mark I describe industrial sectors characterized by creative destruction, in which innovation 
is largely driven by entrepreneurs and new firms, with technological ease of entry and low 
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cumulativeness of knowledge. Such sectors are usually subject of widespread externalities 
(Herstad in Nifustep Rep. 4/2008, Malerba 2005). Other countries copied the two faces model 
with a relatively high degree of success. The exception was the UK, which seemed to be 
lacking the in-house ability of interpreting and benefit from outside R&D. The US 
expenditure on Federal research funding was massive during and after the Second World War, 
and universities and colleges took the lead in high-tech industries. This was partially induced 
by supporters like Vannevar Bush, pushing Big Science like the Manhattan Project (the 
atomic bomb) and other projects aimed at national security. Western Europe began a huge 
journey of catching up in the 1950s, which required major local adaptation of technology 
from the US (von Tunzelmann 1995:219-245). This thesis examines the cooperation between 
StatoilHydro and its customers, suppliers, research institutions and other companies in the oil 
and gas industry. Learning and knowledge development following of these relations is 
regarded as crucial to enhancing innovation. 
From around the 1970’s, progress were being made in innovation in the information and 
communication technology (ICT) sector. This had major implications for R&D, which saw a 
general increase in the knowledge-intensity of advanced industries and economies. Advances 
in ICT also meant a shift in technological components; from mechanical and electro-
mechanical to electronic based systems, for instance in Numerically Controlled Machine 
Tools. Such change also necessitated improvements in software for such machinery in the 
high tech industry. In terms of organization, tendencies towards technological convergence 
(i.e. firms specializing in components used in other industries) made way for horizontal 
linkages between firms, a network of flexible specialization. Attention was drawn to product 
and process flexibility, which allowed for organizational learning. This presupposed close and 
informal relations, as well as formal multi-directional networks, of producers, suppliers and 
customers. These relations were supported by continuous improvements in ICT, which 
allowed for the increased sharing of knowledge and communication which became more and 
more independent of time and place. (Von Tunzelmann 1995:256-269) Formal and informal 
networks for knowledge sharing and learning are subject of interest in this thesis, as they are 
seen to potentially enhance innovation. 
The following will consider some views on innovation processes, and some possible 
implications of this. 
 12 
2.1.3 Innovation Processes 
For policy purposes, the tidy linear model of innovation processes which assume innovation 
processes as a chain of causation, from research to development to production and marketing, 
has been favoured. The linear model thus holds scientific research as the critical element. This 
is however an incomplete view which need to be complemented by a different view which 
consider reconsiderations of steps in the process, feedbacks and reviews of existing 
knowledge, and that some innovations thus come about through a “messy” process of 
interactions. (Fagerberg et al 2005) 
 
The linear model of innovation 
The linear model of innovation has been popular since World War II, most commonly 
associated with Vannevar Bush’s emphasis on public funding for scientific research. Having a 
background as the director of Office for Scientific Research and Development (which was 
responsible for the US military research), he argued that the key to new products and 
processes lay in the development of new basic research. His recommendations led to the 
establishment of a research council, the US National Science Foundation, and inspired many 
other countries to do the same, including Norway. (Godø 2008) The linear model assumes a 
chain of causation with science as the starting point, from which results are developed, and 
proceeds to production and marketing. The linear model is thus useful for those defending the 
interests of researchers, scientists and their organizations. (Fagerberg et al. 2008) 
 
Figure 2.1 The research based, linear model of innovation (in Godø2008:51) 
There are however some problematic issues with this model. Firstly, it assumes that basic 
science has precedence over applied science, indicating a hierarchy of scientific work. It thus 
assumes that basic science is the source of knowledge for applied science and society at large. 
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This view ignores other sources of knowledge development. The linear model has been 
criticized for not providing a realistic image of innovation processes, and that basic science 
has been credited too much to the detriment of other factors. Labelling university research as 
basic research and research done elsewhere in society as applied research has been 
commonplace, among other reasons because of widespread use of an OECD indicator which 
does not consider the actual content of such research. A reason for the broad acceptance of the 
linear model may be that people attending higher education at universities and college are 
imprinted this view by their academic teachers. (Godø 2008) 
The model is however suitable for explaining how some radical innovations have been created 
during the 20th century, where the sources quite clearly have been advanced scientific 
research. Nuclear power, the transistor, sonar and radar, and the mass-production of penicillin 
are examples of this (Godø 2008). In the context of StatoilHydro, innovations on issues such 
as chemicals and multi-phase flows are partially fuelled by mechanisms resembling the linear 
model (for instance cooperation with research institutes or universities). 
 
The interactive model(s) of innovation 
As a response to the linear model of innovation, several models has been developed 
emphasizing the complex and dynamic interactions taking place in an innovation process. In 
the interactive models, the contact and interplay between a market and businesses is the most 
important source of innovations. One popular model is called “the chain-linked model”, 
developed by Kline & Rosenberg (1986). It emphasizes research and science as something 
taking place separate from the business, and that it has only indirect significance for 
innovation activities in firms. Interactive models give emphasis to how feedback from 
suppliers, customers or other relevant groups result in a process of development and 
refinement of an idea that eventually is launched on the market. These processes are complex 
and involving several actors with different linkages and feedback-loops, often presented 
neatly in a flow-chart. In reality, the processes unfolding are even more complex and chaotic. 
(Godø 2008) 
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Figure 2.2 The interactive model of innovation processes, based on Kline and Rosenberg 1986 (in Godø 
2008:53) 
The circular, iterative character of such processes has by some innovation scholars been 
named “the Innovation Journey”, describing the processes as a journey through a terrain 
which is poorly mapped and with unclear solutions (Van de Ven et al. 1999). Some interactive 
models label the contact between market and business “user-producer interaction”, laying 
great emphasis on collecting and interpreting signals from markets and users as a basis for 
choosing direction. This is problematic, because it is often difficult to know how to interpret 
these signals, and the signals themselves are often blurry and ambiguous. A response to this is 
the user-driven model of innovation, put forward by Eric Von Hippel (1988). The model 
assumes that the determining source and force of creating innovations is that the innovator has 
an expectation about harvesting some sort of benefit from the innovation. A person who is 
able to articulate a need, and develop a solution to this need, will most likely expect an 
advantage or profit from this activity. (Godø 2008) 
The model thus identifies users as the most important source of innovations, because their 
needs drive innovations. This view has been subject to criticism, particularly because it is 
lacking in explaining how radical innovations come about. The user-driven model is best 
suited for explaining incremental innovation. (Godø 2008) The different perspectives on the 
interactive model of innovation are applicable to various processes within StatoilHydro. Some 
relate to a user-producer interaction view (for instance cooperation with suppliers), whereas 
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others bear more resemblance to the user-driven model of innovation (interaction with 
operative units). 
The criticisms of the different models reflects an ongoing debate on whether the market (and 
users) is the most important source and force of innovations (market pull), or whether this 
may be attributed to technology development and research (technology push). Supporters of 
the market pull view generally argue that companies and private businesses should control 
their own innovation activities and that public authorities should limit their participation to 
offering beneficial regulations which does not favour any particular technology or sector. 
Opponents to this argue that the technology push is more important, stressing that the market 
offers limited opportunities towards developing innovations, particularly radical ones. They 
further argue that companies are not interested in developing technologies or services 
involving high economic risk. (Godø 2008) Mechanisms of market-pull and technology push 
are both relevant to processes of innovation in StatoilHydro. 
Related to this debate, is the issue of path-dependence. Once a business is involved in a 
certain type of technology development, organizational learning and external relations 
reinforce the technological trajectory. Technology development can not be assessed separate 
from its social, political, cultural historical and ideological context. Contemporary issues in 
society and the internal knowledge base of a business will set a course for its technology 
development. This is however possible to overcome, as new knowledge is produced and 
diffused, people of curiosity perform experiments of trial and error, and through serendipitous 
factors. (Berg & Bruland 1998, Pavitt 2005) StatoilHydro has developed mechanisms through 
which technological trajectories are explored, with a potential of tackling path dependence. 
The following provides an account of the historical context of the Norwegian oil and gas 
industry. 
 
2.2 The Oil- and Gas Industry in Norway – Development 
The Norwegian oil- and gas industry is relatively young compared to similar industries in 
other parts of the world. Search and exploration for oil and gas on the Norwegian continental 
shelf was not discussed and initiated before the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. In this period, 
several international companies negotiated with Norwegian authorities about the rights to 
explore the Norwegian continental shelf. Norway had relations to foreign trade and 
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institutions like GATT, IMF and the World Bank, and saw a general decrease in restrictions 
on trade. Simultaneously, there was a fear for rising unemployment due to a large number of 
childbirths in the early post-war years. The climate for foreign capital was thus positive, 
pushed forward by state initiatives trying to accommodate such investment. During autumn 
1962, American company Phillips, and other multinational companies, contacted Norwegian 
authorities about the possibility of engaging in exploration on Norwegian continental shelf. A 
major goal for the Norwegian policy was to ensure that as many companies as possible would 
engage in as much activity as possible on the Norwegian shelf. This was motivated by a desire 
to find out whether there actually was any oil on the shelf, and thus the first licence-round was 
initiated. (Ryggvik in Olsen & Sejersted 1997:26-32) 
 
2.2.1 Foreign investment and national control 
In this situation, Norwegian industry was discouraged from joining, partially because the 
authorities believed that the uncertainties and risks involved were too great. Next to nothing 
was done in terms of securing the transmission of specific competencies to Norwegian hands. 
In fact, the foreign companies were surprised by how unfavourable the Norwegian companies 
were treated by the authorities. Norwegian companies were awarded very modest portions of 
the licences. Notably, Norsk Hydro argued that Norwegian competencies on relevant 
technology should be a priority. 2 This argument was not taken up by the authorities at that 
point. By the second licence-round, Norwegian authorities requested carried interest 
agreements with the companies who were awarded licences. The Petronord-group (including 
Norsk Hydro), Phillips, and Syracuse accepted. Esso and the Amoco-group (with NOCO, 
predecessor to the Saga company) did not accept this; instead they got net profit agreements. 
The agreements in the second round also stated that the international companies should strive 
to use Norwegian goods and services, and if oil was found on the Norwegian continental 
shelf, then the companies would have to accept that the Norwegian state would take on a more 
active role. (Ryggvik in Olsen & Sejersted 1997:32-37) 
Little was done to build Norwegian competencies in the 60’s. Some attempts were made to 
increase geology competencies, to be better able to evaluate applications. Aker had a contract 
                                                 
2
 Norsk Hydro was at the time one of the oldest and largest industrial companies in Norway, and possessed wide 
technological competencies in chemicals and waterenergy. The Norwegian state held a majority of the shares. 
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on their floating rig Ocean Viking, but this was an exception. In January 1970, the Norwegian 
companies Norsk Hydro, NOCO and Syracuse were summoned to a meeting to discuss joint 
efforts towards exploration north of the 62nd latitude. Several suggestions were made, but the 
negotiations stranded, and the idea of a semi-governmental company was abandoned. Around 
the same time, a major find was done in the Ekofisk-field. The industrial committee in the 
Norwegian parliament lay down “ten commandments” on how Norwegian oil policies were to 
be executed in the forthcoming years. A main point was that national administration and 
control had to be secured, in order to make independent on supplies of crude oil. The state 
would actively support the build-up of a Norwegian integrated oil environment. In addition to 
this, a state oil-company would be established, to handle the business interests of the state. 
 
2.2.2 Statoil and efforts towards Norwegian competencies 
After a series of deliberations, partially due to discussions on Hydro’s role, an unanimous 
parliament passed the bill on establishing a fully governmental oil-company named Statoil, 
June 14th 1972. Statoil was awarded a minimum of 50% of the shares on new blocks, amongst 
others a particularly promising block bordering the Brent-field on British shelf, now known as 
the Statfjord-field. Norsk Hydro and Saga (former NOCO) did not get equally promising 
blocks. At Statfjord, Mobil was awarded operator-status, under the condition that Statoil 
would take over as operator after ten years. Esso was also given priority at Statfjord, given 
that they would train a distinct explorations-department in Statoil. Actions were being made 
to transform Statoil to a proper integrated oil-company; however, through the 1970’s it was 
for the most part a “paper-company”, while the foreign companies did the dirty work. 
(Ryggvik in Olsen & Sejersted 1997:37-47) 
In this period, efforts were being made to increase Norwegian education in oil-relevant areas. 
Geology, shipping and mining was among the major subjects to be improved. Also, the 
Norwegian Science Council (Norges Teknisk-Naturvitenskapelige Forskningsråd, NTNF) 
established scholarships to motivate engineers to go back to school. A distinct education in 
petroleum-engineering was started in Rogaland. However, activity on Norwegian continental 
shelf was predominantly characterized by Americans from top management to middle 
management, with Norwegians as unskilled labour at the bottom. There was grumbling in the 
international companies due to a high level of accidents, and low wages, particularly for 
foreign employees. Norwegian employees were of the opinion that the work culture brought 
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in by the international companies was the cause of accidents and bad work conditions; 
conditions which frequently was a subject of contention between Norwegian employees and 
American foremen. Among other measures to improve conditions, the Norwegian Working 
Environment act was made valid offshore in July 1977. In addition, the companies were 
informed that in future licence-rounds, employment of Norwegian workers would be a 
criterion for awarding licences. (Ryggvik in Olsen & Sejersted 1997:47-50) 
 
2.2.3 Favouring Norwegian businesses 
The following 2-3 years, there was an increase in efforts to strengthen Norwegian 
participation in oil-related activities. A report to the Norwegian parliament (St. meld. Nr. 53 
1979-1980) stated three major concerns; strong governmental engagement, a nationalisation 
of the activity, and national freedom in terms of timing for development, scale of production 
and disposition of petroleum-resources. In effect, this meant that the Norwegian companies 
Statoil, Hydro and Saga got much better conditions for their activities. They got the most 
promising blocks, and operator-status on 5 out of 8 blocks. However, Norwegian 
competencies were still not satisfactory. Agreements were being made with foreign 
companies to assist in technological challenges. There were disagreements among the state 
officials in the Oil- and Energy Department as to how Norwegian strategies should be 
developed in the forthcoming years. Some believed that Statoil should be the only company 
exploring and exploiting the Norwegian continental shelf, whereas others argued that 
collaboration with international companies would be important for a long time ahead, in so far 
technologies are under constant development, and the challenges in the North Sea are 
substantial. Foreign specialized firms were at the time supreme, but Norwegian offshore-
industry was budding. The shipyards-industry, with Aker and Kværner in the front, were 
subject of protectionist regulations from 1975 onwards. Also, the Norwegian companies’ 
engineering-capacity was united in Norwegian Petroleum Consultants (NPC), and an 
agreement with American Brown & Root as joint-venture partner was set up. This enabled 
them to participate actively in the development of large fields. Another condition in the fourth 
license-round, was that the companies were to offer Norwegian institutions and businesses 
research and collaboration-projects, in an effort to include Norwegian industry and researcher 
in technology development. (Ryggvik in Olsen & Sejersted 1997:50-56) 
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2.2.4 Balancing Norwegian efforts and internationalisation 
By the mid-80’s, Statoil’s dominant position in Norwegian offshore industry was considered a 
liability. The company was a major base of power, and to ensure a healthy development in the 
years to come, state involvement was decided to be split in two. One was to be controlled by 
Statoil as usual, and the other was to be controlled directly by the government, called the State 
Direct Economical Engagement (SDØE). A result of this was that Hydro and Saga got better 
conditions, in an effort to create true competition between different national environments. 
The pro-national line that had been growing stronger during the years, now showed its 
potential. Norwegian deliveries to development of fields increased, and several technology-
agreements were being made. The latter was a result of a strategy which rewarded companies 
who contributed to technology-transfer to Norwegian research and development, 
predominantly through performing R&D in Norway in collaboration with Norwegian actors. 
However, the pro-national line was partially abandoned in 1986, as state officials increasingly 
realised the importance of the mutual dependence between national and foreign companies. 
This coincided with a major fall in oil-prices, and an international tendency towards countries 
facilitating for multinational companies to be established in their domestic sphere. Foreign 
companies struggled with the conditions given by Norwegian authorities, and concessions had 
to be made to patch up the situation, especially concerning the taxes for oil companies. 
(Ryggvik in Olsen & Sejersted 1997:56-63) 
The introduction of plans on the internal free market in (what is now) the European Union in 
1985 made several Norwegian companies go international. For the Norwegian government, 
this was a dilemma. On one side, it was considered beneficial that companies could strengthen 
their competitive force in the international markets. On the other hand, many workplaces 
might be moved abroad. Then Norway became part of the European Economic Area (EEA) 
on January 1st 1994, which meant that several of the protectionist regulations had to be 
removed. Companies could now employ workers from within the EEA to the Norwegian 
platforms on similar conditions. Further, the technology agreements in their current form had 
to come to an end. The licence-directives also had to be changed. The Norwegian government 
no longer had the right to prioritize Norwegian companies when awarding licences and 
operator-status. A prevailing attitude in the Norwegian oil-industry at the time was that the 
petroleum industry and the oil companies were solid and competitive, and thus had no more 
need for protectionist regulations. As a consequence, several companies wanted to expand 
abroad. Statoil had in effect prepared for this for a long time, and had built a vertically 
 20 
integrated structure. Though it was a state company and had been protected from competition, 
it had been built after the model of Esso, Shell and BP. It had among other things developed a 
considerable R&D department, to be able to tackle challenges in the joint development 
projects. The remaining oil resources came to be situated in areas which were technologically 
challenging and competence and innovation became crucial to successful exploration and 
extraction. In the early 90’s, Statoil allied with BP on international exploration, and took part 
in projects in Nigeria, Angola, Vietnam and Aserbajdsjan. Norsk Hydro and Saga did not 
engage in equally comprehensive internationalisation. Neither the Norwegian supplier 
industry had the strengths to comprehensive international expansion, due to its constellation 
of small and medium-sized businesses. (Ryggvik in Olsen & Sejersted 1997:63-80) 
The following provides an account of the White Paper on Innovation 2008-2009. 
 
2.3 Innovation policy and the oil and gas industry? 
The oil and gas industry is characterized by capital intensive products which require large-
scale infrastructure, long time-horizons for making profit, and consequently large losses if the 
efforts fail. Further, knowledge development and learning are crucial elements of innovation 
activity. National policies aimed at enhancing innovation need to take these elements into 
consideration. Some issues have been dealt with in white papers from the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry, and the Ministry of Education and Research. Previous policies on innovation in 
Norway have however not been quite as explicit as the recent White Paper on Innovation 
2008-2009, which is the first white paper exclusively dealing with innovation. 
 
2.3.1 The White Paper on Innovation 2008-2009 
The White Paper on Innovation 2008-2009 from the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and 
Industry to the Norwegian Parliament provides some insights as to how Norwegian policies 
may tackle the challenges of innovation. It is stated that the Government has strengthened the 
welfare scheme which is seen to ensure a high level of education and participation in the work 
force, and that the economic policy contributes to good general conditions and thus 
innovation possibilities. One aspect of this is the strengthening of efforts in research, design, 
and entrepeneurship. The White Paper further declare that the Government will establish 
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favourable conditions for; a creative society (with the Norwegian welfare state as a starting 
point); with creative people (made possible through a sound education, research and 
adaptation of working life); and creative undertakings (through the provision of support and 
regulations in the case of market failure). (White Paper No.7 2008-2009) 
More specifically, it is pointed out that knowledge and competencies need to be strengthened. 
The White Paper proposes to reinforce the collaboration between education and working life, 
and invest in on the job training, as well as internationalisation of education. Further, it 
proposes a consideration of the education system with regard to future competence needs, the 
introduction of an action plan on entrepeneurship in education, and the further promotion of 
mathematics, science and technology. (White Paper No.7 2008-2009) For StatoilHydro, these 
efforts may be seen as beneficial in terms of securing further competencies on issues related 
to innovation. For the company, collaboration with educational institutions may provide the 
company with future employees who have a greater understanding of industrial issues, 
because they may get the opportunity of learning by doing alongside formal education. 
Further, sustained promotion of mathematics, science, and technology are obviously also 
important for a company occupied with natural resources and energy. 
The White Paper further elaborates on the support to innovative undertakings. It is 
emphasized that adequate and simple rules are measures which may serve to save industry 
unnecessary costs and release resources for innovation. The allocation of research funds to 
environmental friendly technology is assumed to be another important measure, as well as the 
continued efforts towards encouraging further industrial development based on the abundant 
energy resources. (White Paper No.7 2008-2009) These measures are obviously relevant to 
StatoilHydro’s activities. Simplification of rules and regulations in an industry which has an 
overwhelming number of such to comply with, may release resources for innovation. 
Improved efforts on environmental friendly technology may also be beneficial for the 
company in their New Energy business area. The last point, encouraging further industrial 
development based on abundant energy resources, is unmistakably important as StatoilHydro 
is an energy company. 
Another aspect emphasized by the White Paper is efforts towards research and development. 
Of special interest for StatoilHydro is the strengthening of the industrial doctorates system, as 
well as efforts related to commercialisation of research results. The industrial doctorates 
system provides opportunities for the candidate and the industry to learn from one another, 
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which may enhance innovation. Further, efforts towards commercialisation of research results 
may be beneficial for industry as well as the individual researcher. (White Paper No.7 2008-
2009) 
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3.0 Analytical Framework  
This chapter outlines the analytical framework applied to the empirical findings of this study. 
The first part accounts for literature on organizations and their environment. Here I will also 
briefly present the concept drivers of innovation, which is central to this thesis. The concept 
has been developed as a result of the aforementioned literature, and through analysis of the 
empirical findings. The second part presents literature on knowledge development and 
learning, and especially how this relates to organizational practices. 
 
3.1 Conditions for Innovation and Organizational Design 
An organization is faced with internal and external conditions which influence the 
opportunities of that organization to innovate. The following will consider some approaches 
to this view, and some structural archetypes upon which most organizations are built. This 
provides a foundation for assessing StatoilHydro’s internal and external conditions, and 
positioning the company in relation to some structural archetypes of organization. 
 
3.1.1 Environment/opportunity conditions 
The conditions under which an organization operates influence the opportunities of that 
organization to innovate. Opportunity conditions may be met with internal or external 
strategies (Cohen & Levinthal 1990, Malerba 2005). Innovation processes are thus contingent 
on their environment, and organizational characteristics need to be adapted to these conditions 
(Pavitt 2005). Thompson (1967) notes that an organization will try to adapt its organizational 
structure to the tasks it is set to solve. The environment of an organization is a source of 
uncertainty, but is also significant for which tasks that is important, and their internal 
composition. Thompson defines environment as only the conditions which are task-relevant, 
called task environment, i.e. the environment which is directly influencing the activities of an 
organization. (J. D. Thompson 1967 in Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2005: 200-2002). Alice Lam 
(2005) notes that: (…) contingency theories account for the diversity of organizational forms 
in different technological and task environments (Lam 2005:119). 
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One approach views different environments as defining the rules of different games, 
elaborating on what a task environment might consist of. Miller and Floricel state that: 
 (…) games are inter-organizational patterns of value creation, each of which is able to 
produce a steady flow of innovations. We call these patterns games of innovation because 
each of them is governed by “rules” that emphasize distinct ways of creating value. (…) firms 
find themselves in structured contexts that constrain and orient their approaches to 
innovation. Yet, within the given rules, games offer ample freedom (Miller & Floricel 
2004:27) 
The authors argue that practices must be adapted and specialized to the realities of a game’s 
value creation, and as such, practices are contingent on their environment. Sustained practices 
are a result of learning to adapt to this environment, and structure the innovation journey from 
idea to market (Miller & Floricel 2004). The approach emphasizes different practices and 
organizational capabilities depending on the innovation-game a company is participating in.  
The concept drivers of innovation, which I use extensively in this study, are founded on the 
aforementioned approaches. In addition to opportunity conditions such as market and 
knowledge, I have added regulations and standards as a condition which is part of the task 
environment. The opportunity conditions I describe are intrinsic and internal, as well as 
external forces. Schumpeter Mark II refers to creative accumulation in industries which are 
characterized by large established firms, where new innovators face barriers of entry 
particularly due to the nature of the technological regime in that industry and the market 
conditions. The technological regime is defining of the problems a firm will have to solve in 
its innovative activity, and further affects technological learning, the shaping of incentives 
and limitations of practices and organization, and moreover; influences the basic processes of 
variety generation and selection (and thus the dynamics of firms). The cumulativeness in such 
industries is closely related to market factors, where successful innovations with a high degree 
of appropriability make way for further accumulation of knowledge along distinct trajectories. 
(Herstad in Nifustep Rep. 4/2008, Malerba 2005) 
 
3.1.2 Organizational typologies 
The structural configuration of an organization ideally corresponds to the configuration of the 
relevant technological and market environment. Burns & Stalker suggested that the 
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environment of an organization may be classified as stable and predictable, or unstable and 
unpredictable. Following of this, organizations may be grouped into one of two main types; 
mechanistic and organic. Mechanistic organizations are typically rigid structures in stable and 
predictable environments, characterized by functional differentiation, hierarchical structures 
of communication, control and authority, and a tendency towards vertical interaction between 
employees. As a contrast to this, organic organizations are more fluidly structured as a 
response to unstable and unpredictable environments, and characterized by individual tasks 
adjusted and solved in interaction with others, a network structure of communication, 
authority and control, and interaction and communication which is horizontal. Burns and 
Stalker also note that even though the typologies are polar, some organizations contain a 
mixture of both. (Burns & Stalker 1961, Lam 2005) 
James D. Thompson builds on Burns & Stalker when he argues that certain types of 
organizational structures correspond to their respective task environment. He uses a four-box 
diagram with two dimensions to separate four main types of task environments; (1) degree of 
homogeneity/heterogeneity in the environment; and (2) degree of stability/dynamic.  
 
Figure 3.1 Thompsons (1967) two dimensions of the environment (in Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2005) 
A homogeneous environment (1) represents an environment in which the organization has 
few other actors it has to relate to, and these actors are relatively similar. The organisation 
may thus easily acquire a general idea of actors and events in the environment which are 
crucial to the business. These characterizations correspond to a Schumpeter Mark I pattern, 
wherein the technological regime offers high technological opportunities, low appropriability 
and low cumulativeness. However, a Schumpeter Mark I pattern generally denotes a pattern 
of rapid changes and high uncertainty. A stable environment (2) refers to an environment 
which does not change a lot over time, which means that changes in the environment are 
The environment is: 
Stable  Dynamic 
            
            Homogeneous 
The environment is: 
Heterogeneous  
 
X X 
X X 
 26 
relatively easy to predict. Technological change in stable environments tends to follow 
defined trajectories, in economies of scale, where knowledge development follows a 
cumulative pattern, and barriers to entry are generally high, analogous to Schumpeter Mark II. 
A Schumpeter Mark I pattern of innovation is generally found in homogeneous and dynamic 
environments, whereas Schumpeter Mark II tends to be found in heterogeneous and stable 
environments (Malerba 2005, Herstad in Nifustep Rep. 4/2008). Thompson argued that the 
degree of homogeneity will influence the degree of differentiation in an organisation (i.e 
degree of specialisation), and the degree of stability will influence whether decision-making is 
made centralized or decentralized. This is well in line with the Schumpeterian view. 
Thompson’s perspective builds heavily on Burns and Stalker’s (1961) typologies on 
organizational structures; mechanistic and organic structures. This roughly corresponds to 
stable and homogenous environments, and dynamic and heterogeneous environments 
respectively. (Thompson 1967 in Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2005:200-202) 
Mintzberg (1979) builds among others on Thompson (Thompson 1967 in Jacobsen & 
Thorsvik 2004) and Burns and Stalker (1961) when he presents five structural archetypes of 
organizations. Of these, the divisionalized form and the adhocracy are of special interest. Both 
relate to heterogenous environments, but the divisionalized form is assumed to correspond to 
a stable environment, whereas the adhocracy is characterized by a dynamic and changing 
environment. The divisonalized form is characterized by “quasi-autonomous entities” that are 
loosely connected by a central administrative structure. The adhocracy on the other hand, is 
often based on projects, is flexible and able to deal with dynamic and complex conditions 
rapidly. It is stressed that the strengths of the divisionalized form is that it is able to 
concentrate on highly localized issues, A weakness is however that it often performs 
correspondingly localized R&D to the detriment of central R&D, and there may be 
competition between divisions which inhibit knowledge sharing. The strengths of the 
adhocracy lies in its abilities to learn and unlearn quickly, which makes it highly adaptive and 
innovative. A weakness is that it is unstable and short lived. The structural archetypes are 
ideal types, and that no “pure” form is found in an organisation. Rather, organisations in real 
life are a mix of two or more types (Mintzberg 1979 in Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2005:99-107, 
Lam 2005). 
Matching the organizational structures with its environment is a matter of learning. Pavitt 
(2005) has argued that: 
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(…) innovation processes involve the exploration and exploitation of opportunities for 
new or improved products, processes or services, based either on an advance in 
technical practice (“know-how”), or a change in market demand, or a combination of 
the two. Innovation is therefore essentially a matching process.(Pavitt 2005:88) 
This can be seen in relation to the concept drivers of innovation (i.e. the task environment and 
opportunity conditions), in which exploration and exploitation of opportunities roughly 
translates to development of knowledge and organisational capabilities, whereas market 
demand is translatable to operative. The matching process is thus the process whereby the 
organization identifies and develops different types of knowledge to respond to the drivers of 
innovation. StatoilHydro is continually going through a matching process which is informed 
by assessments on the task environment and the corresponding organizational structures. 
 
3.2 Knowledge and Learning 
The following provides a framework for considering modes of learning and innovation, types 
of knowledge, and some organizational practices linked to these. 
 
3.2.1 Modes of learning and types of knowledge 
Organizations change and adapt to their environment, and such adaptation is a process of 
learning and developing knowledge about internal and external conditions. The following 
accounts for two modes of learning and innovation and types of knowledge. Modes of 
learning and innovation and organizational practices following of these are central to the 
matching processes taking place in StatoilHydro. 
 
Science, Technology and Innovation & Doing, Using, and Interacting 
One approach suited to discuss different types of learning and innovation is put forward by 
Jensen et al. They consider two different modes of learning and innovation, the first being the 
Science, Technology and Innovation mode (STI), and the second being the Doing, Using and 
Interacting (DUI) mode. 
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The two modes of learning and innovation may be seen as relating to dichotomies of 
knowledge. Tacit and codified knowledge and local and global knowledge are typical ways of 
dichotomizing types of knowledge. Tacit and local knowledge is usually associated with the 
DUI mode, whereas codified and global knowledge is associated with the STI mode. 
However, for practical purposes, these may be linked to a set of distinctions which is a little 
more elaborate: know-what, know-why, know-how, know-who. The STI mode is typically 
related to the first two, as it is concentrated on science-based learning. The DUI mode is on 
the other hand related to the latter two distinctions, as know-how and know-who to a great 
extent is based on skill, expertise and learning by interacting (and knowing-who by 
interacting). It is however worth noticing that these are ideal types of learning and innovation, 
and that tacit and codified elements are to be seen as complementary poles on a scale (Jensen 
et. al. 2007). 
The STI mode of innovation and learning is often related to knowledge that may be written 
down and passed to others, for instance through books, manuals or scientific journals. This 
knowledge may be absorbed by others, but this is not an automatic process of knowledge 
transfer; “(…) a prepared mind” is needed (Jensen et al 2007:683). Technology is often 
supported by knowledge derived from science, and is thus incorporating generic, science-like 
understanding (know-why). Knowledge related to particular artefacts, and not generic 
knowledge, is the main difference between technology and science. The STI-mode of 
innovation and learning is mainly related to how firms use and further develop this science-
like knowledge in their innovative activities. Codification of knowledge in order to 
communicate with other scientists is thus an important feature of solving problems in the STI-
mode. (Jensen et al 2007) 
The DUI mode of innovation and learning is related to practice in technological fields which 
is not necessarily written down or readily codifiable. An employee may have learnt that one 
way or the other simply “works”, without any considerable understanding of why. Such 
knowledge is often learnt on the job, and “(…) enhances the skills and know-how of their 
employees and extends their repertoires. (…) complex processes may involve interaction 
within and between teams and may result in new shared routines for the organization” (Jensen 
et al 2007:684). Such practice may also involve linkages to actors from outside the company, 
such as suppliers and customers, and are often informal. DUI-learning is related to tacit and 
localized knowledge in the form of know-how and know-who. It is possible to facilitate such 
learning through organizational structures and practices that promote teamwork, problem-
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solving groups, and rotation of jobs. This is referred to as learning by doing, using and 
interacting. (Jensen et al. 2007) 
 
Analytic/synthetic knowledge 
The DUI and STI modes of learning and innovation account for different approaches to 
learning and innovation. This may result in different types of knowledge, by Asheim and 
Gertler (2005) coined analytic and synthetic knowledge. The authors note that the different 
types of knowledge involve different mixes of tacit and codified knowledge, with different 
codification possibilities and limits. They further relate to different qualifications, skills, 
organizations and institutions, and innovation challenges and pressures. (Asheim & Gertler 
2005) 
A synthetic knowledge base is dominant in industrial settings, where there often is a need for 
solving specific problems that come up through the interaction with customers and suppliers. 
Synthetic knowledge most commonly refers to application or novel combination of existing 
knowledge. Tacit knowledge is important because synthetic knowledge is often produced 
through learning by doing, using and interacting (the DUI-mode), activities requiring a high 
degree of concrete know-how, craft and practical skill. (Asheim & Gertler 2005) 
On the opposite side, analytic knowledge is prevailing in settings where scientific knowledge 
is important, where problem-solving often take the form of creating knowledge through basic 
and applied science, and systematic development of products and processes. Analytic 
knowledge is characterized by the production of formal models, codified science and rational 
processes. Codification of knowledge is essential because inputs are often based on reviews of 
existing studies, and the generation of knowledge is based on application of widely 
understood and shared scientific principles and methods. Processes of knowledge are highly 
formalized and concerned with documenting results through reports, electronic files, and 
patenting. (Asheim & Gertler 2005) 
Related to analytic and synthetic knowledge is the concept of knowledge spillovers, which 
suggest that innovation processes are spatially concentrated, even if codified knowledge is 
central in the activity. Knowledge spillovers emphasize the social aspects of innovation 
processes, such as the informal social networks of scientists and other workers. (Asheim & 
Gertler 2005) 
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3.2.2 Organizational practices for learning and knowledge development 
Related to the two modes of learning and innovation and synthetic/analytic knowledge, we 
find some organizational practices. The practices may be seen as supporting the 
aforementioned types of learning and knowledge through providing flexibility and (often) 
decentralization of decisions. 
Jensen et al. (2007) consider four organizational practices; interdisciplinary workgroups; 
quality circles, systems for collecting proposals; and autonomous groups. Clegg et al. (2005) 
notes that organizations tend to develop intraorganizatonal and external capabilities of 
learning and knowledge development, which often is organized as cross-functional and cross-
boundary teams. Organizations are becoming more interactive horizontally and vertically. 
This has by some been termed postbureaucracy, network organization or virtual 
organization, emphasizing absence of formal rules and hierarchy, and a more or less loose 
network structure which is supported by information technology. (Clegg et al. 2005:96-98)  
Wenger notes that learning is a process of social participation which includes four 
components; community, practice, identity and meaning. The author uses the term 
communities of practice to refer to this relationship of components. For an organization, the 
term communities of practice:  
(…) means that learning is an issue of sustaining the interconnected communities of 
practice through which an organization knows what it knows, and thus becomes 
effective and valuable as an organization. (…) if we believe that people in 
organizations contribute to organizational goals by participating inventively in 
practices that can never be fully captured by institutionalized processes, then we will 
minimize prescription, suspecting that too much of it discourages the very 
inventiveness that makes practices effective (Wenger 1998:8). 
This is a rather effective argument for establishing interdisciplinary workgroups and similar 
practices for innovative activities, in so far they are able to facilitate community building and 
give members access to resources for learning, enabling action and decision-making “(…) 
which fully engage their own knowledgeability” (Wenger 1998:10). 
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Lazonick notes that traditionally, Japanese firms have been integrating shop-floor workers in 
organizational learning, whereas companies in the US tended to maintain a sharp 
segmentation in the labour force. This cross-functional integration is seen as important in 
producing an integrated skill base (Lazonick 2005:42-45). Demarcations between employee 
groups are assumed to be softer in the J-form of organizational integration, which may 
facilitate more effective communication in the organizational layers. People in one layer has a 
general knowledge of each other and can communicate with people in the layer over or under, 
regardless of departmental boundaries. This is a contrast to the bureaucratic line of 
communication in the US form, where an employee at a given level goes through a 
hierarchical tree of superior officers to reach an employee at the same level in a different 
department. (Dertouzos 1989:97) Increased horizontal and vertical interaction through various 
types of practices such as teams and workgroups are assumed to enhance learning and 
knowledge development. 
 
3.2.3 Cooperation and search 
Cooperation between companies in its most intense form includes a commitment to the 
sharing of existing knowledge for the purpose of developing new knowledge. This process 
points to how a company’s boundaries may be porous in two ways; inside-out and outside-in. 
Cooperation may provide opportunities to access complementary resources, and to internalize 
external knowledge spillovers. Choosing to cooperate rests on several reasons; access to 
proprietary technology, access to skills, know-how and other tacit knowledge, cost and risk 
sharing, and specialization. It also requires trust, insofar the companies involved attempt to 
develop mutual understandings of what is to be achieved and expose their knowledge. 
Cooperation may be subject to lock-in, due to the intense engagement and irreversible 
investments made. (Vision Eranet 2008:15, 32, 62) 
Search on the other hand is essential for businesses to gain an overview of what goes on in the 
industry beyond their cooperative partners, and is thus usually broad. (Vision Eranet 2008) 
A company interface with external actors and exchange information and knowledge to a 
varying degree with these actors. Notably, this means that the boundaries between the firm 
and its environment becomes more porous and “(…) embedded in loosely coupled networks 
of different actors, collectively and individually working toward commercializing new 
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knowledge” (Laursen & Salter 2006:132) Companies search their internal and external 
interfaces to gain knowledge which may be applied to innovative activities. Breadth in 
relation to search practices refers to how many sources or search channels that a firm uses in 
its innovation (explore knowledge), whereas depth refers to the intensity of such relations, i.e. 
how the firm draws deeply (exploit knowledge) from a given channel. Further, it is argued 
that a firm will go through a process of trial and error with a given search channel, in order to 
learn how to absorb knowledge from this source (Ahuja & Katila 2002, Laursen & Salter 
2006). 
An hypothesis in the search-perspective is that some firms tend to “over-search”, meaning 
that at a given point, efforts towards search exceeds the payback in form of applicable ideas 
and knowledge. It is suggested that a reason for this is that interaction with a source needs to 
be sustained over time, because search not only involves scanning wide numbers of sources, 
but also to learn and draw knowledge from these sources (Ahuja & Katila 2002, Laursen & 
Salter 2006:135-136). 
One article on knowledge search considers how the maturity of knowledge in a firm 
influences the search for new knowledge. It suggests two opposite propositions; that a firm’s 
old knowledge base may be helpful in enhancing innovation, and that this may function as a 
supplement to more recent knowledge on issues relevant to enhancing innovation. The other 
proposition suggests that old knowledge may hurt innovation, because it constrains the 
adaptation to the environment and inhibits learning. Moreover, matching the organization 
with its environment through capacity building in emerging areas and reduced costs of search 
is put forward as an explanation for how new knowledge may enhance innovation. (Katila 
2002) 
A major point in the article is that the propositions of how old knowledge may help or hurt 
innovation are not contradictory, but that they relate to different kinds of knowledge. A firms 
search-space is divided in three; search of internal knowledge, search of industry knowledge 
(spillovers) and search of outside-industry knowledge. Relevance of the age of knowledge 
depends on where the firm searches. The article puts forward that relying on old (mature) 
knowledge from competitors will harm innovation. Further, internal (firm-specific) 
knowledge takes a curvi-linear relationship to innovation. Mature knowledge stemming from 
external areas (outside-industry) has a positive effect on innovation, and is further enhanced 
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by increased diversity of the external search. In other words, old external knowledge can be a 
source of new innovations. (Katila 2002) 
 
Summary: 
The analytical framework which has been presented provides insights as to how StatoilHydro 
is organized in relation to the drivers of innovation, and how this is sought to be met through 
modes of learning and innovation and organizational practices. 
 34 
4.0 Research Design and Methods  
This chapter will provide an account of the research design and methods applied in this study. 
This includes formulation of research questions, data collection, population sample and 
chosen variables. Some points on the codification process, reliability and validity of the study 
will also be discussed. 
 
4.1. Research Design  
A research design refers to how a study is formed in order to answer the research questions. 
Yin has labelled this an action plan, noting that: “(…) a research design is an action plan for 
getting from here to there, where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be 
answered, and there is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions” (Yin 
1994:19). He proposes a set of components which are particularly important in case studies: 
(1) a study’s questions, (2) its propositions, if any, (3) its unit(s) of analysis, (4) the logic 
linking the data to the propositions, and (5) the criteria for interpreting the findings. (Yin 
1994:20) 
 
4.1.1. A case study based research design  
Studying processes of learning and knowledge development in one specific company calls for 
a case study approach. Case studies are suitable for understanding complex social phenomena 
where the investigator has little or no control over events. It “(…) allows to retain the holistic 
and meaningful characteristics of real life events – such as individual life cycles, 
organizational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, international relations and 
the maturation of industries” (Yin 1994:3). 
 
4.2. Population and Sample 
“A case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of 
that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population) (Gerring 
2007:20). The unit of study (the sample) is not entirely representative of the population 
 35 
(Gerring 2007). Propositions put forward in this study relate to a company in the oil and gas 
industry, but can be applied to companies residing in other industries. 
In order to find a sample unit, an inquiry was forwarded to the Industrial Park at Herøya in 
Porsgrunn.  Representatives of the present StatoilHydro research centre responded positively. 
This resulted in a series of meetings with key people in the research organization, where the 
topic of study and possible respondents were discussed. Respondents have been selected 
progressively, based on informal talks with people working with organizational issues related 
to innovation in StatoilHydro. This approach is analogous to a snowballing approach 
(Johannesen & Tufte 2002). In order to gain a broader empirical base and understanding of 
the activities, respondents were chosen from two different research centres within 
StatoilHydro, holding different positions. Some work as scientists and innovators, others as 
administrative staff, and others again as managers with responsibilities for innovation 
processes. Due to limited time and large amounts of data, respondents have only been chosen 
from the research community in StatoilHydro.. 
 
4.3 Data Sources and Collection 
The empirical material of this study was collected through five individual in-depth, 
semistructured interviews, and five individual informal, unstructured interviews. In addition 
to this one observation of a meeting place for scientists and operative units was done, as well 
as documentary analysis of documents related to innovation strategy and values. Using 
multiple sources of evidence is assumed to strengthen the validity of a study; insofar the 
sources all address the same facts. Individual sources of evidence may possess different 
strengths and weaknesses, and should be considered complementary to one another. Using a 
process of triangulation of data sources will significantly enhance the quality of a case study 
(Yin 1994). 
A total of ten people were interviewed, all of which done face-to-face. The respondents were 
chosen because of their extensive knowledge on innovation processes and knowledge 
development in StatoilHydro. All interviews were done in the period from October 2008 to 
January 2009. Of these, five were semi-structured interviews lasting between one hour and 
two hours. A guide of questions was used during the interviews, and new information that 
came up was used as a basis for pursuing interesting themes. The interviews were thus 
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focused, but provided flexibility for asking open-ended questions about facts that came up 
during the interview and the respondent’s thoughts on this matter. In some of the interviews 
(and indeed through the informal meetings prior to the interviews), the respondents provided 
insights to themes and topics which proved highly useful for later data collection (Yin 1994). 
The same is true for the last five interviews, which were more open-ended and flexible. These 
interviews lasted between half an hour and two hours. Due to issues of confidentiality and 
strategy, the respondents are kept anonymous. This is also the case for some of their 
expressions on topics related to innovation projects. 
Some of the empirical data stem from direct observation of people and activities in the 
research organization of StatoilHydro. I was a guest at the Porsgrunn Research Centre for 
approximately three weeks while doing interviews. I was set up with an office of my own, and 
assigned a contact-person in case I had any general questions. This period proved highly 
useful for me. I had the opportunity to do interviews, go back to my office and do notes or 
work on other issues of the research. If any questions arose, I could just go and knock on a 
door. This period thus allowed for some general observation of the inner workings of the 
research centre. Further, I experienced that as soon as an interviewee learnt that I was in fact 
working there for a period, and had also gone through the internal safety-course, the 
interviewee suddenly seemed to be a lot more enthusiastic about answering questions and 
helping me out in gathering information. I also visited the Trondheim Research Centre for one 
day to do interviews and participate in an Innovation Café. At the Centre I met up with people 
from the Porsgrunn Research Centre who guided me throughout the day. My guides, and 
general observation of activities and specifically the Innovation Café provided highly useful 
background information and information specific to the Café. In addition to this, some 
observation was done through establishing contact and doing preliminary research such as 
informal talks and visits. I developed a thematic observation-guide for the Innovation Café 
based on prior knowledge provided by some of the respondents. The guide was a big help in 
collecting information on various themes during the observation. The general observation 
through various contact with StatoilHydro, and the observation of the Innovation Café has 
been invaluable to the study. Contextual information provided during interviews has been 
easier to capture and understand due to this observation, and the analysis has benefited greatly 
from this. Observational evidence may add new dimensions for understanding contexts or 
phenomena, and provides additional information. (Yin 1994) 
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Collecting empirical data through written sources has been an important part of the data 
collection, especially in the early phases of the research design. The research questions and 
the interview guide has benefited greatly from these sources. Reading documents on 
innovation policy issues, administrative and strategic documents, websites, and newspaper 
articles has provided information about activities, actors and technologies related to 
innovation in StatoilHydro. This has also supported the understanding of empirical findings 
and subsequent analysis. Yin notes that when using documents as a source of data collection, 
it is important to be aware of any possible bias on the author’s part (and own bias related to 
type of source). Although documents may be biased, or meant for a different audience that the 
researcher, they may still provide helpful information that may strengthen or enhance 
information from other types of data collection. (Yin 1994) 
  
4.4 Validity and Reliability 
An important aspect of a research design is whether it takes into account issues of validity and 
reliability. Yin (1994) divides validity into three subcategories; construct validity; internal 
validity and external validity. 
Construct validity is concerned with whether the investigator has established correct 
operational measures for the concepts being studied. Three strategies has been used to 
increase construct validity; (1) the use of multiple sources which all address the same facts, 
i.e. triangulation; (2) establishing a chain of evidence, i.e. allowing an external observes to 
trace empirical evidence from initial research questions through case study protocol to 
conclusion; (3) key respondents should have an opportunity to review the draft case study 
report. Internal validity is for this study a matter of whether the investigator makes inferences 
based on events that has not been directly observed. An event is assumed to be a result of an 
earlier occurrence which the investigator has come to know of through interviews or 
documents. A strategy of pattern-matching is one way of addressing internal validity, where 
an empirical pattern is compared with a predicted one. If the patterns match, this may 
strengthen the internal validity. External validity relates to whether a study’s findings may be 
generalizable beyond the current case. As noted above on population and sample, findings in 
this study are analytically generalizable, in so far propositions may be tested on other firms 
and industries. The centre of attention for this study is learning and knowledge related to 
drivers of innovation in one company, but it is possible to consider some implications of these 
 38 
propositions for firm strategies in other industries. This as what Yin refers to as analytical 
generalization, not to be confused with statistical generalization, which is a whole different 
matter. Analytical generalization means attempting to generalize a particular set of results to a 
broader theory. (Yin 1994) 
Reliability deals with the issue of whether an investigator copying the same procedures on the 
exact same case would arrive at the same findings and conclusions. The goal is thus to reduce 
the occurrence of errors and biases in the study. Ensuring a high degree of reliability has been 
sought through developing an outline of the thesis, a case study protocol, and interview 
guides. (Yin 1994) 
 
4.5 Data Codification and Analysis 
Interviews and observation means that huge amounts of data are collected. This data need to 
be structured somehow as to provide overview and some order prior to analysis. This should 
be considered prior to the collection. Implicit and explicit categories have been identified in 
the data, and have made it possible to sort the data into two matrix systems, one for each 
research question. Such coding is the foundation for what comes later in the analysis. 
Analysing the data in this study has been a process of alternating inductive and deductive 
processes. The data has been compared and subjected to processes of abstraction, which has 
opened them for conceptualization and further comparison with theoretical frameworks. Such 
processes bear resemblance to the grounded theory approach. (Punch 2005) 
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5.0 Drivers of Innovation 
This chapter will present main findings and an analysis of the collected data, using relevant 
literature. Based on theory introduced in the previous chapter, and empirical data from the 
two research centres, the emphasis will be on external and internal conditions relevant to 
innovation. The research question I will be discussing is (1) “What drivers of innovation is 
StatoilHydro operating under, and what kinds of needs for knowledge development follows of 
these?”. 
The research question will be answered by assessing the external setting of the two chosen 
research centres in StatoilHydro. I have distinguished three main categories of drivers of 
innovation; Operative Needs; Standards, Regulations and Social Demands, and Knowledge. 
These will be dealt with separately, and discussed in light of relevant literature, specifically 
regarding external environments and organizational design. The last section of part one of the 
analysis will consider organizational aspects linked to the drivers of innovation and needs for 
knowledge development in the industry. 
 
5.1 Drivers of Innovation 
By the concept drivers of innovation I refer to a set of external and internal factors which 
condition the needs for knowledge development in the organization. These drivers constitute 
the major factors of the environment within which an organization exist, and pose specific 
challenges that the organization must be able to deal with, in order to succeed with their 
innovation. Innovation processes are thus contingent (Pavitt 2005:87). This means that 
corresponding types of knowledge need to be created, developed and sustained, if the 
organization wishes to succeed in this environment.  
Thompson (1967) defines environment as only the conditions which are task relevant. The 
drivers of innovation may be seen as a general analogy to the task environment, but with one 
distinction; a driver may be internal or intrinsic as well as external (J. D. Thompson 1967 in 
Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2005: 200-2002). The research centres are situated within a large 
organization, and have linkages to actors and deal with challenges coming from within 
StatoilHydro and outside. Thus it may be argued that their task environment is both internal 
factors and circumstances in the company, and whatever lies outside the boundaries of the 
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company. This is in line with literature emphasizing how organizations co-evolve with their 
environments (Van den Bosch et al 1999). I have separated three broad categories of drivers 
of innovation; Operative needs; Standards, Regulations and Social Demands; and Knowledge. 
The issue of contingency on the environment has also been labelled opportunity conditions, 
and the general framework of drivers of innovation is partially built on this (Cohen & 
Levinthal 1990, Malerba 2005). The Operative Needs category is thus based on market 
conditions, and the Knowledge category is based on technological opportunities. In addition I 
have added Standards, Regulations and Social Demands as a category, to highlight the 
importance of these issues as opportunity conditions. These are merely analytical categories, 
as all three are by nature interrelated and to a varying extent overlapping. Especially the 
Knowledge category may be seen as somewhat intrinsic in Operative Needs and Standards, 
Regulations and Social Demands. I have however chosen to keep this as a separate category, 
to highlight how knowledge may act as an individual driving force requiring more knowledge 
to be developed. The three categories constitute the task environment of the research centres. 
The following section will identify operative needs, and how they may influence needs for 
knowledge development, and consequently research and innovation. 
 
5.1.1 Operative Needs 
StatoilHydro is involved in a vast range of activities throughout the value chain. One of the 
major tasks of the research centres is to provide support to the various activities in the 
business areas; Exploration and Production Norway, International Exploration and 
Production, Natural Gas, Manufacturing and Marketing, Projects, and Technology and New 
Energy. One of the respondents stresses the importance of technology development to face the 
upcoming challenges in the oil-and gas sector:  
(…) I will put forward technology and expertise as extremely important. There will be 
greater challenges in the oil-sector… greater depths and oilfields, and thus technology 
is essential to manage the challenges which will arise. So something has to come 
about in terms of development and innovation… I think that is the most important 
point actually. 
The statement emphasizes technology and expertise as crucial. It points out that the 
characteristics of exploration and production will change, and that this will give rise to a 
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change in the challenges the companies are faced with. Development and innovation is thus 
brought up as an answer to the new challenges. StatoilHydro is moving internationally, and 
this poses new challenges for the company. A respondent elaborates, highlighting that 
StatoilHydro believe they can contribute. Participation in fields like Shtokman in the Arctic, 
great depths outside Brasil and the Gulf of Mexico, oilsand in Canada and energy sources like 
windmills is pointed out as areas where the company may provide novel solutions. Another 
point is that going internationally means that the company is faced with different cultures, 
political regulations, and a need for local suppliers. It is further argued that: 
A business will always have an eye for new ways of making money; this is a kind of a 
driving force. If you look at our industry in general, the large oilfields are generally 
found and in production, or they are situated in areas that are difficult to access. (…) 
Firstly, it is an important driving force for the company to develop itself. The second 
point is that we see that the Norwegian shelf has a more limited potential for 
development than it had before. And then we look at where we can contribute. 
This business development is one of several factors for development and innovation. 
Operative units breaking new ground will obviously have a need for new knowledge and 
technology. This has been the case also in projects on Norwegian shelf. For instance, for the 
projects Snøhvit and Ormen Lange, radically new solutions had to be developed. This was 
made possible partially due to extensive research on multiphase-flows. 
However, a lot of technology development is based on improving existing installations and 
technology. Several of the respondents note that the pace in the oil and gas sector is quite 
slow; indeed it is described as conservative. One describes it as bringing a tankship about; it is 
not easy, it takes time… It is acknowledged that sometimes larger changes occur, but this is 
not common. The slow pace of the industry is explained as a result of the large investments 
needed to build out fields and keep operations running. If something goes wrong, there are 
large economical losses. Risk assessment and security is put forward as another explanation. 
Introducing a new technology without adequate analysis may result in accidents or unforeseen 
events, and this is obviously not desirable. There are however a few companies which are 
more innovative than others, the respondent notes, and StatoilHydro is benchmarked as one of 
the top companies in the industry regarding innovation. 
As Thompson (1967) has argued, the environment influences the tasks of an organisation. A 
researcher notes that one of the most important points in doing innovation is to understand 
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what kind of needs the organization actually has. Having a very clear definition of a problem 
or challenge is incredibly important. At the research centres, there is an ongoing close 
cooperation with field units and suppliers. This is explained as due to the need for information 
on what kinds of issues that is pertinent in the field, what kinds of problems they deal with, 
and thus what topics the research centres should be working on. Collaboration between 
business units within the company is underlined as crucial to obtain new knowledge on 
industry issues.  
It is noted by a respondent that there is a tension between fundamental research and what 
takes place on a platform or a production unit. There is sometimes a vast distance between 
what happens in a field unit, and what a researcher in a research centre wants to test and 
develop. For a manager on a platform, there are plenty of things to handle, and thus there may 
be a barrier for some to allow for new technology to be implemented and tested. Clayton 
Christensen argues that this is a major dilemma for companies: When should the traditional 
practices be abandoned to make way for radical innovations? Or how does one know that an 
innovation will fail? (Christensen 1997). Being in an industry which relies heavily on 
cumulative knowledge, there is a great risk of path dependence in technological trajectories 
(Christensen 1997, Dosi 1982). This may be overcome, for instance through environmental 
regulations which force the companies to develop radically new technologies. Overall, there 
seems to be a general agreement amongst the respondents that feedback on operative needs is 
one of several important bases for deciding the direction of work in the research centres, and 
consequently innovation projects. 
For the category Operative needs, it is stated that the company is moving more and more 
internationally and thus the characteristics of exploration and production change. This calls 
for more knowledge on cultural issues in the countries where the company operates, as well as 
knowledge of laws and regulations. Further, this means that more knowledge on business 
development needs to be developed, to face the new conditions. In addition to this, domestic 
and international operative units continually undergo risk assessments and security analysis. 
To ensure high quality of these evaluations, it is critical to continuously improve and develop 
tools for analysis and assessment. By name of the category, it is intrinsic that operative units 
need knowledge on operational issues that are grounded in scientific, organizational, cultural, 
social and business related topics.  
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5.1.2 Standards, Regulations and Social Demands 
StatoilHydro has several external actors which they need to relate to somehow. Of these, 
some are governmental bodies regulating operational activity and maintaining industry 
standards. Others serve as lobby groups and try to influence these governmental bodies and 
the oil companies. In addition to this there are transnational political agreements, for instance 
the Kyoto agreement, which influence national policies and the confines of the oil and gas 
industry. A researcher remark that there are few other companies, except StatoilHydro, that 
directly or indirectly has been subject to such a large amount of political regulations. This is 
also notable when the company enters a country: “(…) In a way, for better or worse, we 
become an actor in a situation where we often are appointed the role of a successful national 
oil company”(R3). This is explained as somewhat problematic in some cases, but the 
company tries to adapt to the external factors of the current country. This is put forward as an 
advantage, as these external factors are important for technological development, and thus 
function as a driving force.  
There are different actors to relate to when it comes to regulations and standards for 
installations, security and products. For instance, sometimes approval is needed by the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, and fuel-stations for the pilot project on hydrogen-cars 
must be approved by the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning. There are 
also internal groups working on issues related to health, environment and security (HSE). In 
an industry which has seen several serious accidents in its early history, there are many 
governmental regulations on HSE. 
A respondent comments that while there are a lot of regulations to adhere to, there is in some 
cases of new technology a lack of such. Certification agencies must sometimes have help to 
be able to do their work, because the technology is so new that no regulations exist for it. The 
hydrogen cars and the fuel stations are used as an example: 
(…) storing hydrogen, how to store it in tanks. The other is safety in the fuelling 
process, what  parts fit together to get it (the fuel) over to the car and regulations on 
this, user-friendliness and demands on that part. I think they struggle a lot, the 
certification authorities, because they don’t have anything to start with. So the 
industry has to provide guidance, to make these things happen. If not we will have a 
kind of evil circle of not getting started. The dilemma is that if one wants something to 
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happen, one need to do a bit of trial and error to get data to be able to standardise a 
product 
This situation of having or not having regulations to adhere to puts the industry in a special 
situation. On one hand, they have guidelines in how solutions should be, which in some cases 
may act as a restraint on innovative efforts. On the other hand, where the company is breaking 
new technological ground, this may serve as an opportunity to think outside the box, and in 
fact participate in bringing about regulations for this technological field. Various forms of 
learning are a crucial factor in this situation. Types of learning and organizational practices 
will be elaborated in the second part of the analysis. In terms of regulations driving 
innovation, the potential of ground-breaking innovation may serve as a carrot. 
Needs for knowledge development are also identifiable in the efforts towards reducing 
emissions. A researcher argues that the Norwegian government is very strict when it comes to 
emissions, and this means that StatoilHydro has to be innovative on that area, to be able to 
produce oil in the North Sea. The CO2 issues changes the framework conditions, meaning 
that the company has to operate in other ways than it would have done ten years ago. He 
further notes that this is not necessarily a negative consequence: 
(…) this is actually a competitive advantage in latter phases, because we see that 
Norway is a country leading the way as an example, and others follow, an then we 
already have the technology in place. It is just as much a business opportunity as a 
disadvantage. In the short run it is a disadvantage because one has to invest more, but 
in the long run it is a business opportunity. 
It is quite explicitly expressed here that the strict regulations are an important driver of 
innovation. The regulations also mean that the company is forced to investigate technological 
opportunities that it might not have done otherwise. This highlights a need for knowledge in 
the scientific disciplines which may be applicable in these new technological opportunities. A 
respondent emphasizes the role of the government in the Mongstad test centre. The test centre 
is a collaborative project between StatoilHydro, Vattenfall, Dong Energy, Shell and Gassnova 
SF, aimed at developing knowledge on carbon capture and storage (CCS). The Norwegian 
government has agreed to support the centre financially, covering some 80% of the costs. He 
tells that this is very important in order to tackle the CO2 challenge, because the government 
has been able to identify main issues in the industry, and then managed to make industrial 
actors work together to solve the tasks ahead. This will hopefully provide important insights 
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which may be used for future innovations on CO2 challenges. Regulations, standards and 
social demands are thus an important force for driving innovation, and as mentioned above, 
demonstrate some distinct needs for knowledge development. 
For the category Standards, Regulations and Social Demands it is noted that regulations and 
standards are a major factor in technology development. Governmental and HSE standards 
and regulations require, first of all; knowledge on this vast field of regulations and standards, 
and secondly; competencies in how to interpret and then handle different regulations. Thirdly, 
as respondents have noted, there are new technological fields in which the regulatory 
authorities have not yet been able to generate regulations. This means that companies and 
authorities may contribute to develop regulations jointly. In addition, when new regulations 
arise there may be a need to explore new domains of knowledge and technological 
opportunities to be able to respond to these new regulations. An example here is more 
rigorous regulations on emissions and subsequently the efforts on CCS technology at 
Mongstad. 
 
5.1.3 Knowledge driving Innovation 
Given the broad range of activities within StatoilHydro, there is a need for people within 
many different academic disciplines. Different types of knowledge are crucial in enabling 
people to perform activities within the various business areas. One respondent emphasizes the 
importance of strong organizational capabilities in ensuring communication and hands on 
expertise. Another respondent point out that cooperation with suppliers is both a way of 
easing acquisition processes, and a way of improving knowledge on a product and its 
supplier. This enables StatoilHydro to easier see how that product may or may not be 
implemented in a development-project.  
Linkages to universities and research communities are also important sources of knowledge, 
and critical for development and innovation: 
(…) I believe that the most important role the government can have in relation to 
innovation, is to make sure that the fundamental competencies are in place. This 
means that the universities are doing well and that they actually get the resources they 
need to stay on top and climb further on university rankings, and that the research 
communities get basic funding, so that they can develop competencies, try to identify 
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project-ideas, product-ideas, which they can market to the industry. (…) it is really the 
businesses’ role to be innovators. So the most important thing the government can do 
is to make sure that we have skilled, competent people. 
This illustrates how knowledge is seen as a prerequisite for enabling innovation. It is also seen 
as a type of driver for innovation, insofar it is stated that research communities may market 
ideas to the industry. The respondent is also stating that there are several aspects of 
knowledge. He points to the universities as a provider of knowledge in the form of research, 
and knowledge in the form of competent and skilled people. This distinction is important 
because it does not only see knowledge as a standalone package, but links knowledge to 
people and their skills. Close cooperation with universities and other research institutions is 
underlined as important. The company supports some academic research through their 
research centres, for instance through professorships and joint work on research topics. A 
researcher emphasizes that: “(…) Science as a driving force of business development and 
innovation is very strong in our company.” This is a clear statement of the role of knowledge 
in relation to innovation. Knowledge is seen as permeating activities throughout the industry.  
Knowledge as a driver of innovation calls for knowledge development on several levels and 
areas. Scientific knowledge and academic research is an obvious candidate for knowledge 
development, which may be seen as fuelling the development of new solutions and building 
competencies. For example, this was the case in the Snøhvit project, in which new solutions 
was developed partially due to research on multiphase-flows. In addition, there is a need for 
development of “knowledge on knowledge”. This is a variety of organisational capabilities, 
for instance knowledge on how to communicate satisfactorily so that operative needs get 
through to research facilities, and vice versa that researchers communicate novel solutions and 
are given the opportunity to test these. This also calls for an improved understanding on all 
parts, of these needs, a sort of “knowing what’s going on”, to know what to work on. 
Lazonick notes that traditionally, Japanese firms have been integrating shop-floor workers in 
organizational learning, whereas companies in the US tended to maintain a sharp 
segmentation in the labour force. Cross-functional integration is seen as important in 
producing an integrated skill base (Lazonick 2005:42-45). A dimension of the emphasis on 
communication is also to develop competencies in how to handle internal tension, whether it 
be between departments, professional groups, operative units and administrative or R&D units 
and so forth. Knowledge on knowledge also interprets to a need for development of 
competencies in searching widely to find new knowledge and exploiting it. Knowledge in 
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scientific and technological fields not traditionally applied by the oil and gas industry may 
prove itself useful. Further, knowledge in how to manage these relations satisfactory is crucial 
to be able to obtain the “right” information. Similarly, such knowledge is needed to be able to 
identify and manage ideas internally and externally. Organizational capabilities are here 
explained as critical for developing other kinds of knowledge and thus responding to the 
drivers of innovation. Managers must be able to identify competitive strengths and 
weaknesses within the firm’s skill base, and make changes for enabling an innovative 
response to the drivers’ (Lazonick 2005:34). Structural archetypes may thus be seen as 
structures which may or may not be supporting these organizational capabilities (Mintzberg 
1979, Thompson 1967).  
 
5.2 Industry-specific conditions 
In the above, three categories of drivers of innovation have been introduced, as well as some 
suggestions to what kinds of needs for knowledge development that follows from these. As 
noted, drivers of innovation may be seen as a general analogy to task environment (Thompson 
1967 in Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2004), and opportunity conditions (Malerba 2005, Pavitt 2005, 
Cohen & Levinthal 1990). Thompson argues that certain types of organisational structures 
correspond to the task environment. He introduces two continuums; degree of homogeneity or 
heterogeneity; and degree of stability or dynamic. The first corresponds to the degree of 
functional differentiation in an organization, and the latter influence whether decision making 
is centralized or not.  
Companies operating in the oil and gas industry may be situated according to these 
characterizations. The environment in the industry is quite obviously heterogeneous. But is it 
stable or dynamic? As noted, the respondents argue that the pace of the industry is slow and 
conservative. Risk assessment and security issues are brought forward as a reason for this, 
together with the large investments needed for building out fields and keeping operations 
running. But, I do not agree that this is grounds for labelling the environment stable. The 
notion on risk assessments, security issues and heavy investments shows that there is an 
intrinsic understanding of these issues as bearers of large uncertainties. Further, Lazonick 
notes that:  
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(…) the innovation process is uncertain, because, by definition, what needs to be 
learned about transforming technologies and accessing markets can only be known 
through the process itself. By investing in learning, an innovative strategy confronts 
the uncertain character of the innovation process (Lazonick 2005:30). 
Notably, relations with industrial suppliers, developers, innovators and R&D communities 
might mean that some units within companies in the industry are exposed to highly dynamic 
conditions, as innovation processes are inherently uncertain (Pavitt 2005:88). This is not a 
stable environment; but is it dynamic in every sense? I would argue that different units within 
companies face different conditions, some of which are stable, and some of which are 
dynamic. This places a company’s environment as heterogeneous on one dimension, and on 
the other dimension the environment is somewhat stretched from stable to dynamic, 
emphasizing the extent to which a department or project is faced with uncertainty. Companies 
in the oil and gas industry are faced with conditions which in some cases fit with a 
Schumpeter Mark II pattern, in which the technological regime is characterized by high 
appropriability and high cumulativeness of knowledge, whereas in other cases, such as the 
exploration of new and technologically challenging fields or the introduction of new 
environmental regulations, some conditions fit better in a Schumpeter Mark I pattern (Herstad 
in Nifustep Rep. 4/2008, Malerba 2005). This is due to the fact that for instance new 
challenging fields or new environmental regulations may call for a change of the 
technological regime. This presupposes an organizational form which enables a certain degree 
of autonomy and flexibility, somewhere along the continuum from the divisionalized form to 
the adhocracy. Lazonick argues that organizational integration is what determines the 
innovative capability in a firm, and that the type of organizational integration is contingent on 
industries, technologies, markets, institutional environments and over time (Lazonick 
2005:50). 
To solve the need for knowledge on scientific and technical issues, and at the same time 
secure a capacity for internal translation and application of this knowledge, integration of a 
R&D unit in the company may prove to have important advantages. This is largely due to the 
combination of specialized and tacit knowledge which may be achieved through intrafirm 
collaboration, resulting in firm-specific experience. The aforementioned cross-functional 
integration may serve as a possible strategy for this (Lazonick 2005:42-45). However, if the 
knowledge needed is reliant on several specialized bases of knowledge, it may be more 
beneficial for the company to collaborate on parts of, or the whole production of a service, 
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process, or product with suppliers. This technological convergence might be beneficial 
because the supplier is specialized in combining certain knowledge bases and user feedback, 
an activity which may include skills of craft and often tacit elements. However, there might be 
great advantages in maintaining a close relationship with the supplier, in order to exchange 
information and knowledge related to development, operation and improvement of the 
specialized input (Pavitt 2005:89-93). Lazonick notes that: “(…) the essence of the innovative 
firm is the organizational integration of a skill base that can engage in collective and 
cumulative learning (Lazonick 2005:34). In-house R&D together with relations between firm 
and suppliers, customers and research communities may prove useful for creating or acquiring 
knowledge and experience on technological issues, relational competencies, communication, 
and strategies for information search.
 6.0 StatoilHydro and Knowledge 
The previous chapter has discussed the drivers of innovation under which StatoilHydro 
operates, and what kinds of needs for knowledge creation that follows of these. The following 
will consider how the company actually organizes its knowledge development and use under 
these conditions, in order to answer the second research question: “How is the firm organizing 
its knowledge development and use within these conditions?” The first section will account 
for the general organizational structure in StatoilHydro, which is senn as a reflection of the 
opportunity conditions (Malerba 2005, Pavitt 2005, Cohen & Levinthal 1990) in the industry. 
The second section will make use of a framework that considers two modes of innovation and 
learning which both play a role in the oil and gas industry; the Science, Technology and 
Innovation (STI) mode; and the Doing, Using and Interacting (DUI) mode (Jensen et al. 
2007). Some organizational practices will be examined in order to assess the extent to which 
the two modes of innovation and learning exist within StatoilHydro. Further, some 
perspectives on organizational practices regarding cooperation and search will be discussed. 
These perspectives may suggest that the two-modes-framework might need an elaboration. 
The last section will have a look at a particular project within StatoilHydro, called the “New 
Ideas” project. It is intended to support the pursuit and development of ideas in the company. 
Relevant literature will be used to discuss the significance of this project for use and 
development of knowledge, as responses to the drivers of innovation. This is interesting also 
in relation to the Innovation Café. This is an arena where operative units may present issues 
and challenges to the research community in the company. The intention is for this to be an 
informal arena for discussion and brainstorming, no strings attached. 
The following will consider how the company is organized under the conditions of the 
innovation drivers. 
 
6.1 The organization of StatoilHydro 
According to Thompson (1967), a company with a heterogeneous, but stable environment will 
seek to divide its environment into several internally homogenous subgroups. Special 
departments are established for each subgroup and are supposed to be self-supporting.  This 
typology is to an extent visible in StatoilHydro, through the different business areas; 
Exploration and Production Norway, International Exploration and Production, Natural Gas, 
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Manufacturing and Marketing, Projects, and Technology and New Energy. However, for 
some units and projects within these business areas, the characterization of the environment as 
heterogeneous and dynamic is more appropriate. For instance, large projects like Snøhvit and 
Ormen Lange belong under this typology, as well as some of the innovation projects in the 
research centres. They have in common that there is a high degree of uncertainty because they 
in one way or the other are breaking new ground. More specifically, they are situated in an 
environment where knowledge development may occur through disruptive or radical 
innovation, for instance through applying knowledge from a different technological domain to 
solve an industrial challenge. According to Thompson (1967), a heterogeneous and dynamic 
environment will often invest in vertical and horizontal systems for exchanging information. 
It is also typically characterized of decentralisation, less standardisation and a somewhat less 
clear division of labour; an “organic” structure (Thompson 1967 in Jacobsen & Thorsvik 
2005). For instance, the research centres participate in projects configured as matrix-
organisations with people assigned from different departments. 
The categorization of StatoilHydro’s environment points out that it exists in a heterogenous 
environment and on a continuum between stable and dynamic conditions. This positions the 
company as predominantly an organic structure. Within the heterogeneous dimension, two 
structural archetypes are particularly relevant to StatoilHydro; the divisionalized form and the 
adhocracy form. These commonly correspond to stable and unstable environments 
respectively. It is however important to stress that the structural archetypes are ideal types, 
and that no “pure” form is found in an organisation. Rather, organisations in real life are a mix 
of two or more types (Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2005:99-107, Lam 2005). This mix is also evident 
in that the innovation patterns in the company bears elements of Schumpeter Mark I and II. 
Innovative activity aimed at continual improvement of exploration and production tends to be 
characterized by high accumulation, high appropriability and correspondingly high barriers of 
entry; creative accumulation found in Schumpeter Mark II. However, StatoilHydro is also 
engaged in the development of new technological regimes of renewable energy, as well as 
exploring new and alternative technological solutions to challenges in the established business 
areas. Entrepreneurs and small and medium sized firms play an important role in these 
technological regimes, which to some extent is characterized by widespread externalities, and 
where creative destruction is at play, referred to as Schumpeter Mark I (Herstad in Nifustep 
Rep. 4/2008, Malerba 2005).The conditions under which StatoilHydro operate call for a 
relatively flexible organization which is fit to handle change and uncertainty as well as a 
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continual development of the core knowledge bases. An organizational structure with a mix of 
divisionalized structures as well as adhocracy structures may be a response to this. 
 
6.2 Development and Use of Knowledge 
There is a variety of knowledge needed to respond to the drivers of innovation. This section 
will consider the empirical findings by the use of a framework describing two modes of 
learning and innovation (and thus practices to solve various needs for knowledge 
development). The two modes are the Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) mode, and 
the Doing, Using and Interacting (DUI) mode. Different themes relating to the two modes are 
discussed below. 
 
6.2.1 DUI-mode learning and innovation 
DUI-mode learning and innovation may be divided into a set of organizational practices. 
These are discussed together in this section. They are thoroughly described in literature on 
“learning organizations” and “High Performance Work Systems” (Clegg et al. 2005, Cohen & 
L 1990, Dertouzos 1989, Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2004, Jensen et al 2007, Lazonick 2005, 
Narula 2003, Pavitt 2005, Wenger 1998). The literature provides elaborate typologies of 
organizational practices (which are relevant to the flexibility and ability to learn and unlearn 
of the adhocracy form). These organizational practices are intended to facilitate employee 
involvement in problem-solving and decision making. (Jensen et al 2007). 
The research organization (i.e. not only the two research centres, but the internal research 
community at large) within StatoilHydro is organized according to a matrix system. This 
system is made up of two axes, with one axis holding research resources such as scientists, 
and a project-axis defining goals and holding financial funding. These two axes operate 
together to form project-teams, in which members may come from different disciplines and 
departments. This is a form of organizing interdisciplinary workgroups which is established in 
order to facilitate problem-solving and learning in the innovative activities of the company. 
There are also several arenas for discussion and sharing experience, which may be called 
quality circles. One respondent notes that there are internal process-networks and professional 
networks across the organization where solutions and needs are discussed and passed on. 
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Often, there are discipline leaders (professionals holding special positions in technical or 
scientific knowledge) who facilitate the sharing of experience and skill to units who need it. 
There are also peer reviews, in which experts on technical or scientific fields, and specialists 
from operative units are assembled to assess an idea or an innovation project. Further, 
Innovation Café’s provide a meeting point where operational needs are communicated to an 
interdisciplinary community of researchers, which come up with and review ideas in an 
informal setting. There exists a particular project for nurturing and commercializing ideas, 
called New Ideas. In this a committee of professionals evaluate ideas and distribute funding 
and personnel, based on similar criteria as the peer review. It is also worth noting that units 
are relatively autonomous, insofar they are free to structure their innovation-processes as they 
see fit. 
The flexibility of these organizational structures is underlined as an enabling feature for 
learning and innovation. Learning should happen “where things happen”, and those 
performing services and creating products are often better at seeing what needs to be done 
than the top management. This calls for a decentralisation of decision-making, sometimes 
through autonomous groups. These need to have the necessary skill and freedom to think 
creatively about experiences, and undergo processes of trial and error. Written rules and 
routines are often kept at a minimum, and the activites done under these conditions are often 
divided into roles, rather than “jobs” (because a “job” defines an area of responsibility, 
whereas different roles may have overlapping task-descriptions). Further, horizontal 
communication is of great importance (Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2005:342-342). Different parts 
of the company absorb different kinds of knowledge from its environment, and this 
knowledge need to be circulated and linked internally to identify its value to the organization 
(Cohen & Levinthal 1990). Adequate communication between the various parts of 
StatoilHydro is thus crucial. The process- and professional networks and the peer reviews 
described above, as well as the matrix-organisation, are apt to facilitate collaboration and the 
development of localized and tacit knowledge as the DUI-mode emphasizes. In such 
organizational practices, know-how and know who are crucial. Enabling learning through 
organizational practices which are stressed by the DUI-mode of learning and innovation are 
thus a critical factor to develop the needed knowledge to respond to the drivers of innovation. 
A scientist remarks that stronger organizational abilities are a key area of continuous 
improvement. The reason for this is that even though StatoilHydro is a large company, 
relatively clear and short lines of communication is needed for sustaining flexibility and a 
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hands on approach to solving issues. Too much bureaucracy is seen as a threat to sustainable 
activities. Several of the respondents suggest that rotation of people to various functions in the 
company, and particularly contact with the operative units, are of great importance to achieve 
a thorough understanding of the business. It is noted that some scientists have been walking 
around with tunnel vision, focusing only on own scientific work and showing little 
understanding for issues in the operative units. The difference between the US form and the 
Japanese J-form of organizational integration may be seen in relation to this statement 
(Lazonick 2005, Pavitt 2005). Further demarcations between employee groups are assumed to 
be softer in the J-form of organizational integration, which may facilitate more effective 
communication in the organizational layers (Dertouzos 1989:97)  
The respondents express a need for reconciliation of the tension between desires to develop 
ideas and test pilots in the research centres, and the needs for handling current issues in 
operative units. Exploring alternatives for the integration of functions and softening 
demarcations between employee groups (for instance between researchers and platform-
personnel, analogous to the Japanese shop-floor workers) may be one element in facilitating 
increased DUI-mode learning and innovation. This would also be a step towards Wenger’s 
(1998) concept of communities of practice. 
One theme of the DUI-mode of learning and innovation is concerned with cooperation with 
customers and suppliers (Jensen et al 2007). In this context, customers may be understood as 
other units in StatoilHydro to which the research community provide products and services. In 
this particular case-study, cooperation in the DUI mode is thus linked to organizational 
integration, softened demarcations and high performance work systems. As several of the 
respondents remark, there is a tension between operative units and researchers in developing 
solutions for different operative purposes, and testing ideas and performing pilot-projects. It is 
important to recognize that this is only part of the picture. Generally, problems at a field unit 
are communicated to a research centre, a researcher tells: 
(…) operational problems in a field unit, it would be natural for them to make contact 
with a technological milieu, and such is often located at the research centres. And then 
this becomes the dialogue that contributes to a communication of some need in a field 
unit. (…) I believe this is one of the strongest driving forces of innovation. Exactly the 
point of understanding the needs of the clients. (…) It is communicated, partially 
formally, and partially through acquaintances. 
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This is a very explicit expression of operational needs as a driver of innovation, and it also 
notes the importance of understanding the needs of the clients. This underlines a need for 
knowledge development, regarding satisfactory communication between research centres and 
operational units. It also points to how this happens, through formal communication and 
individual initiatives. 
The networks and forums for exchanging needs and solutions are used actively. Sometimes a 
need is expressed by several of the operative units (customers), which mean that the need is 
amplified, and further cooperative action is taken to investigate and produce specific 
knowledge of the current issue. For instance, this includes special task forces of scientists and 
engineers sent out to platforms. These cooperate with platform personnel in order to achieve a 
better understanding of the issue, and propose solutions developed through this interaction. 
By nature, this interaction is characterized by highly localized and tacit knowledge, as well as 
elements of codified and globalized knowledge. Such interaction is thus fuelled by DUI-mode 
learning as well as STI-mode learning. This is what Asheim & Gertler has labelled synthetic 
knowledge, i. e. knowledge which requires know-how, practical skill and “(…) learning by 
doing, using and interacting” (Asheim & Gertler 2005:295).  
Suppliers may be sources of tacit knowledge and skills which are highly specialized to 
technological regimes. Cooperation with suppliers may thus be beneficial for learning skills 
and expertise on the specialized development, operation and improvement of a product or 
service (Pavitt 2005:89-93). In the DUI-mode, cooperation with suppliers and customers 
relate to learning by interacting. The STI-mode will consider learning by interacting as 
cooperation with knowledge institutions, and such relations are thus not part of the DUI-mode 
of learning and innovation (Jensen et al 2007). A researcher points out the importance of 
technology agreements, which are agreements on technology development between the 
company and suppliers. There has been a long running cooperation particularly with firms 
working with oil wells and reservoirs. FMC Technologies, Schlumberger, Halliburton and 
Baker are among major participants in this. This cooperation contributes to increased 
understanding of challenges and possible solutions for wells. It is also important for reducing 
risk and providing confidence in working solutions. Some suppliers possess highly 
specialized knowledge on products and services, which may provide useful insights for the 
company. This knowledge contains elements of tacit and localized knowledge, as well as 
codified, science-like knowledge. Interacting with the supplier is thus an important activity in 
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order to stay ahead, and achieve an understanding of why a product or service works, and how 
and where it may be applied (Pavitt 2005:89-93). A respondent has noted that: 
(…) we saw that the value of maintaining the same supplier over time, knowing the 
people coming out who knew the platform, this advantage was that big that we have 
chosen to undertake a few such contracts. (…) there are four firms, dominating in the 
industry, with which we have cooperation on technology development. (…) had 
framework-agreements with specific suppliers in order to simplify the purchase, and 
improve our knowledge on that product and that supplier, so that we are certain, and 
may more easily see how we can make use of that product in construction-projects. 
The development of synthetic knowledge and learning by interacting is made explicit in this 
statement, and underlines the need for cooperation with suppliers. Such cooperation is part of 
what makes the company able to solve the needs for knowledge development and thus 
responding to the drivers of innovation. 
 
6.2.2 STI-mode learning and innovation 
It is stated by one of the respondents, that some 2.2 billion NOK is spent on R&D internally, 
and external R&D activities and linkages. In terms of internal competencies, there are 
continual evaluations as to what kind of disciplines that are not sufficiently represented, and 
where this should be situated. A researcher notes that rotating scientifically trained personnel 
back and forth between operative units and research facilities is seen as highly beneficial both 
for research and achieving an operative unit of high quality. However scientifically trained 
personnel has also posed a challenge in the past, before establishing the matrix system. In a 
combined resource and task organization, it was found to be difficult to recruit scientists to 
new projects, because they tended to give priority to their own tasks and interests. This was a 
kind of “king on the hill” problem, which posed a big dilemma for the research organisation 
in terms of getting the mix of disciplines right in projects. 
Laursen & Salter (2004) note in an article that universities’ direct contribution to industrial 
innovation is most likely among companies that have existing capabilities in R&D, and a 
relatively open approach to seeking information from external sources. However, it is noted 
that this describes a relatively linear relationship between universities and firms, which may 
be misleading. Companies like StatoilHydro, that use several sources of knowledge such as 
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suppliers, customers, own R&D and fairs and conference, tend to also draw on knowledge 
stemming from university research; but this is just one of many sources. (Laursen & Salter 
2004:1212). StatoilHydro is engaged in various types of cooperation with universities and 
research institutes. One researcher remarked that there is extensive cooperation with the 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), in Trondheim. One of the 
research centres of StatoilHydro is located in Trondheim and is host to academic work and 
some professoriates stemming from NTNU. The company also has cooperation with The 
Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters (DNVA), through a program called VISTA. It is 
noted that this cooperation is “(…) simply because we want to stimulate academic research 
within our disciplines. This is obviously important to us.”  
It is also worth noting that StatoilHydro participate in work where students are challenged to 
find solutions to current issues in the industry, and the company is host to student-projects as 
well as visiting scientists and researchers from universities and research institutes. Interaction 
with universities and research institutes is dominated by codified and globalized elements of 
knowledge, though carrying some tacit and localized elements as well. Asheim & Gertler has 
labelled this analytic knowledge, highlighting the extent to which this knowledge is 
characterized by know-what and know-why types of knowledge which is found in the STI-
mode of learning and innovation. Knowledge creation is here typically based on “(…) formal 
models, codified science and rational processes” (Asheim & Gertler 2005:296). One of the 
respondents has noted that access to university knowledge through the basic competencies of 
graduates and through the work of research communities is a major task for the government, 
if it wants the domestic industry to be internationally competitive. 
 
6.2.3 Summary of the analysis of DUI and STI modes of learning and innovation 
The above analysis of the use and development of knowledge in StatoilHydro has applied the 
DUI-mode and STI mode of learning and innovation. This has been supplemented by a 
distinction between synthetic and analytic knowledge. In the analysis of the DUI-theme on 
cooperation with customers and suppliers, it is argued that a task force interacting with 
platform personnel to solve an operative challenge will participate in the production of tacit 
and highly localized knowledge, i.e. synthetic knowledge, but will also make use of elements 
of codified and globalized knowledge, related to the technology at issue. A reverse 
mechanism may be identified in the production of analytic knowledge. Though analytic 
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knowledge is characterized by codifiable and global knowledge, mainly emphasizing know-
what and know-why knowledge, this type of learning and knowledge production is also 
characterized by tacit and localized elements of knowledge. For instance, cooperation with 
universities through (as stated by Jensen et al 2007) often informal and personal relationships 
may require know-who knowledge, which is predominantly found in the DUI-mode of 
learning and innovation. Elements of know-how knowledge may also be traced in the way in 
which this interaction go about, for instance through joint research on specific scientific 
issues, in which failed experiments or projects produce knowledge which is never published 
or made formal (Asheim & Gertler 2005). As such, the DUI-mode and the STI-mode of 
learning and innovation may be seen as mutually supporting and interdependent in 
StatoilHydro’s case. Learning through interacting may to an extent be found in both modes of 
learning and innovation, not only in the DUI-mode. 
I would like to point out that the descriptions of DUI mode and STI mode cooperation show 
some characteristics of communities of practice (Wenger 1998), in the sense that it involves 
close cooperation, with relatively informal relations and consists of people with more or less 
shared experience and to a various extent common expertise in a given field. This shows that 
the organizational practices not only are confined to organizational boundaries, but extend 
beyond these to inter-organizational relations between individuals or groups of individuals. 
These practices contribute greatly to the innovative performance of StatoilHydro. This 
contribution is most significantly the way in which such practices build and improve upon 
various types of knowledge and expertise, which may serve to further improve innovation.  
 
6.3 Cooperation and search 
Cooperation can be used as a substitute or supplement to in-house R&D. There is a variety of 
forms such an arrangement may take, but a common feature is a commitment to the sharing of 
existing knowledge for the purpose of developing new knowledge. A company’s boundaries 
may be porous in two ways; inside-out and outside-in. Cooperation may provide opportunities 
to access complementary resources, and to internalize external knowledge spillovers (Vision 
Eranet Report 2008).  Moreover, cooperation may be an option in cases where a company is 
participating in globalized markets, but due to the capital-intensity of such activities and the 
inherent risk of innovation, a firm cannot afford to be present in every country. A company 
may wish to exploit the characteristics of given countries (or technologies) that represent 
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inputs to innovative processes, which is required to generate new competitive advantage. 
Internalizing and undertaking all aspects of value-adding activity through exclusive units in 
every location is Utopian, and perhaps not desirable (Narula 2003). StatoilHydro is for 
instance engaged in exploration and production in Canada and Azerbaijan, as well as several 
other countries. These undertakings are not all exclusively StatoilHydro activities, but to a 
varying degree cooperation with other actors. Choosing to cooperate requires trust, insofar the 
companies involved attempt to develop mutual understandings of what is to be achieved and 
expose their knowledge. Cooperation may be subject to lock-in, due to the intense 
engagement and irreversible investments made. (Vision Eranet 2008:15, 32, 62) 
Search on the other hand is essential for businesses to gain an overview of what goes on in the 
industry beyond their cooperative partners, and is thus usually broad. (Vision Eranet 2008) 
Search as an organizational practice is to a varying degree infused in the aforementioned 
indicators of DUI and STI modes of learning and innovation. A company interface with 
external actors and exchange information and knowledge to a varying degree with these actors 
(Ahuja & Katila 2002, Laursen & Salter 2006) Notably, this means that the boundaries 
between the firm and its environment becomes more porous and “(…) embedded in loosely 
coupled networks of different actors, collectively and individually working toward 
commercializing new knowledge” (Laursen & Salter 2006:132).  
Breadth in relation to search practices refers to how many sources or search channels that a 
firm uses in its innovation, in other words how broadly a company explore its environment, 
and surrounding environments. Depth refers to the intensity of such relations, i.e. whether the 
firm draws deeply from a given channel, and thus exploits that channel. It is argued that a firm 
will go through a process of trial and error with a given search channel, in order to learn how 
to absorb knowledge from this source (Ahuja & Katila 2002, Laursen & Salter 2006). An 
example for StatoilHydro would be engaging in cooperation with a new university, a new 
supplier, or even setting up a new operational unit in which the terms for cooperation with the 
research community and other supportive structures must be negotiated. 
StatoilHydro is broadly engaged in search through their extensive cooperation with a large 
number of actors. The search space of StatoilHydro, i.e. the range of actors with which the 
company interact, may be divided in three categories; (1) the internal search space is 
constituted by the company’s research community, units within the various business areas of 
the company (such as platforms, terminals, different development programs etc), and top 
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management; (2) the industrial search space is made up of competitors, suppliers, discipline-
specific research-communities and universities, and organs for industry-specific regulations 
and production of knowledge (for instance the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, the 
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway, the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency 
Planning etc); (3), lastly, the outside-industry search space constitutes actors producing 
knowledge which may be useful for StatoilHydro, but which has not yet been applied by the 
oil and gas industry. (Katila 2002) 
The degree of maturity of knowledge drawn from the different actors affects the innovation in 
different ways. For instance, the internal knowledge base of a firm is assumed to have a curvi-
linear (inverted U-shape) relationship to innovation. More specifically, this means that the 
innovation in StatoilHydro is positively affected by a balanced mixture of mature (old) and 
new knowledge. The tension between the research centres and the operative units may give an 
illustration of this. Further, relying on old knowledge stemming from the industrial search 
space will most likely harm innovation in the company. Thirdly, knowledge from the outside-
industry search space is assumed to have a positive effect on innovation.  
The last point is elaborated by a respondent, as he notes explicitly that knowledge produced 
for an entirely different domain has proved useful. Knowledge from medical technology – 
computer tomography which is used for visualisation of internal organs – has been adjusted to 
analyze geological core samples. Another example is prevention of hydrate formation in 
multi-phase pipelines. These hydrate formations take the form of an ice-structure, and may 
plug the pipeline. Some sort of antifreeze liquid is needed, and one researcher got the idea of 
looking to animals or insects living in arctic areas. Some small creatures were identified, 
which produced frost-reducing substances in their bodies. The researcher then tried to copy 
these chemical substances and analyze how much would be needed for a pipeline. This is put 
forward by the respondent as an example of how important it is to open up for knowledge and 
inspiration from elsewhere, and how this drives innovation. The examples from medical 
technology and biology illustrate that old knowledge from the outside-industry search space 
may enhance innovation. (Katila 2002) 
An interesting hypothesis in the search-perspective is that some firms tend to “over-search”, 
meaning that at a given point, efforts towards search exceeds the payback in form of 
applicable ideas and knowledge. A major reason for this is that interaction with a source 
needs to be sustained over time, because search not only involves scanning wide numbers of 
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sources, but also to learn and draw knowledge from these sources (Laursen & Salter 
2006:135-136). As noted above on the DUI and STI-modes of learning and innovation, 
interaction and sustained relations is important for learning and knowledge development. It is 
a challenge to know when and where to locate efforts in order to be able to absorb knowledge 
from a source, and reducing the uncertainty as to whether that source will be useful for 
innovative activities; “(…) a prepared mind” is needed (Jensen et al 2007:681). A respondent 
notes that the role of the researcher is changing: 
(…) I think that it changes the role of the researcher; I think that to connect to those 
who may contribute with their own work, and actually start there… That is a 
somewhat different role than what has been seen before, and it might go a little further 
than the academic view of things, but from an industrial standing point, this is 
important. Procter & Gamble has made a brand new way of doing innovation, which 
they call Connect & Develop, which I believe is good. It may give the company more, 
with fewer resources, compared to other strategies. 
This comment highlights the importance of search as a strategy for developing knowledge and 
learning through interaction. The Procter & Gamble (P&G) strategy is a stark contrast to 
traditional research and innovation, and is an example of a type of “reverse” search strategy, 
where innovators and people with ideas make contact with P&G and negotiate development 
contracts with the company. In addition, the company license trademarks, technologies, 
engineering solutions, market research methods etc (www.pg.com). The respondent’s note on 
how the role of the researcher is changing may be seen as an illustration of how absorbing 
knowledge and learning from different sources, and where to locate this, is contingent upon a 
“prepared mind”, a point which has been emphasized by several scholars (Asheim & Gertler 
2005, Cohen & Levinthal 1990, Jensen et al. 2007, Laursen & Salter 2004/2006). Further, an 
awareness of how organizational integration affects internal communication and abilities to 
explore and exploit knowledge is important;  
“(…) Organizational integration is necessary for firms to absorb knowledge from the 
external environment, as this requires broad interfaces with this environment, and for 
these to be able to recombine, redevelop and exploit this knowledge through internal 
communication and diffusion. For instance, it is reasonable to assume that the 
marketing department has its ears more open towards customer preferences than the 
R&D department; but what is absorbed has little value if it does not reach and is 
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understood by R&D. Similarly, the purchasing department is in a much better position 
to search the supplier base for ideas and knowledge, but the value of this may very 
well be contingent on diffusion to and understanding by R&D, marketing and top 
management.” (Vision Eranet 2008:16). 
The next section will give a brief account of two empirical findings in StatoilHydro, which 
describe how innovation projects may come about, and how their initial journey may begin. 
 
6.4 The New Ideas Project and the Innovation Café 
StatoilHydro has established a project called “New Ideas”, which is a mechanism for 
developing ideas which does not fit in with the thoughts and strategies of the established 
development programs. The project owns its own pool of financial resources which is 
separate to the financing systems of the ordinary R&D programs. The purpose of New Ideas 
is that potentially great ideas which do not fit with company strategies should be given a 
chance to be developed and tested. In line with company philosophy, an idea does not have to 
be fully developed, or even thoroughly investigated before being registered internally. Ideas 
often stem from researcher interaction with operative units, or the operative units report 
problems themselves. Innovation Cafés are also sources of ideas (which will be accounted for 
below), as well as interaction with suppliers, universities, research institutes, and participation 
at fairs. It is noted that knowledge of available solutions and building blocks, and the 
individual knowledge and expertise of the innovator is a prerequisite for understanding the 
challenge. Interdisciplinary collaboration is brought forward as a salient feature of this 
understanding. 
When an idea has been registered, the innovator may apply for funding. The idea is then 
brought to a peer review, which assess the idea and its potential to solve a given need. This 
peer review consists of experts from various fields, which give an evaluation of the idea and 
its technological aspects. The main focus is here whether the idea is technically doable, not 
whether it has business potential. A group of leaders will then assess needs for personnel and 
financing, and New Ideas is thus considered as a possible funder. As it is implicit in the New 
Ideas project that the innovations not necessarily have to be part of current R&D projects, this 
allows for the exploration of alternative strategies for developing the company. 
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6.4.1 “This is not what we do, is it?” 
One innovation came from a group of researchers initially brought in to assess solutions to a 
problem with gas flowing into a pipeline designed to extract oil. The researchers were 
supposed to assess different solutions provides by suppliers, and pick the best solution for 
implementation. However, none of the solutions were found to be good enough. The 
researchers speculated on alternative ideas, and came up with a solution based on prior 
experience with the effects of flow-pressure on gas and oil. The idea was registered, and a 
peer review was undertaken. It was however not met with enthusiasm amongst the researchers 
in the peer review, or by the research management. A general attitude was that this was not 
part of “what we do”, and that it was not important. The innovators persisted in their attempt 
to develop the idea, and were ultimately granted funding for making more models and 
simulations, and eventually lab-tests. The idea had to compete against the suppliers’ concepts, 
but in the end persuaded in providing the best solution for the problem, and is now 
implemented on a platform. It is estimated to provide massive profits for the company, and is 
named “a possible game-changer”. 
This example gives an illustration of how an idea which stem from interaction with suppliers, 
and initially is assumed to be far off the traditional track of the research centre, may provide 
substantial advantage if it is allowed to be developed. The researchers, who initially were 
supposed to assess solutions from suppliers, had to rely on synthetic as well as analytic 
knowledge when they came to the conclusion that none of the initial solutions were 
satisfactory. This knowledge also played a crucial role in enabling the researchers to come up 
with a new idea. Further, it may be argued that the resistance the researchers faced internally 
was due to an internal, though local, lack of absorptive capacity; in a sense, the peer review 
board, and the research management did not have a sufficiently “prepared mind” which made 
them able to identify the idea as a good one (Cohen & Levinthal 1990, Jensen et al. 2007). It 
is not uncommon for large companies to struggle with this type of challenges, as managers 
seldom are able to fully understand their environment, and thus opportunities for innovation 
which may yield great competitive advantage (Christensen 1997) The funding system did 
however allow for the idea to be developed further, and this revealed great potentials. 
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6.4.2 Innovation Café 
Another mechanism for solving the needs for knowledge development is the Innovation Café. 
This a meeting place for operative units and researchers which is set up a few times during the 
year. The general framework is quite simple: the duration is approximately one hour, people 
from the research organisation are gathered on a voluntary basis, and presented with a need in 
a operative unit, and some failed solutions to the problem. They are then divided into teams of 
four or five, and given a certain amount of time to brainstorm about the problem. After 20 
minutes, the groups give a brief summary of their ideas and discuss together. Then the groups 
separate and discuss for another 20 minutes, before summarizing and discussing again. The 
representative from the operative unit is present and answers questions and comment on the 
different ideas. After the Café, the ideas are being sent to the representative, which may get in 
contact with the people who have proposed the different ideas and establish further 
cooperation. This is a type of organizational practice which may contribute to DUI-mode 
learning, and it also gives opportunities for interdisciplinary cooperation and discussion. It is 
also a practice which may develop more communication and cooperation with operative units 
and contribute to the development of communities of practice, by offering an informal and 
voluntary meeting place for people working with related fields of knowledge. Further, such a 
practice may be viewed as a type of internal search strategy, in which knowledgeable people 
from various parts of the organization may provide linkages to external sources of knowledge 
and learning, from which they have prior experience (Katila 2002). 
The analysis has provided a thorough examination of the key findings in this study and a basis 
for some summarizing thoughts on the significance for future firm strategy, policy making 
and further research. These will be elaborated in the final chapter.  
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7.0 Towards some Conclusions… 
The analysis has provided insights that has sought to answer the two research questions; (1) 
What drivers of innovation is StatoilHydro operating under, and what kind of needs for 
knowledge development follows of these?, and; (2) How is the firm organizing its knowledge 
development under these conditions?  
In the first part of the analysis, the drivers of innovation were identified in three categories (1) 
Operative Needs, (2) Standards, Regulations and Social Demands, and (3) Knowledge. This 
initiated an account on what needs for knowledge development such drivers bring about. 
Further, I have offered a discussion as to how these drivers of innovation generally are 
assumed to influence the way a company is organized, thus being able to solve these needs for 
knowledge development. In doing so, StatoilHydro has been situated in an organizational 
typology which bears elements of two structural archetypes; the divisionalized form and the 
adhocracy form. 
The second part of the analysis has thus been concentrated on analysing how StatoilHydro 
actually organize their knowledge development and use. The DUI and STI-modes of learning 
and innovation has been seen in relation to empirical findings on organizational practices 
which are relevant for solving the needs for knowledge development. I further analyzed 
search as a practice for gaining knowledge, with special emphasis on StatoilHydros search 
spaces, and how the maturity of knowledge might influence innovation. 
One of the major findings is that the organizational practices in StatoilHydro for developing 
and using knowledge bear strong elements of DUI and STI-mode learning and innovation. 
The two modes of learning and innovation may be seen as mutually supporting and 
interdependent in StatoilHydro, and strongly contribute to solve the needs for knowledge 
development and accordingly respond to the drivers of innovation. Further, search has been 
established as an organizational practice in the company which is regarded as important for 
enhancing innovation. Another interesting finding is the tension between the R&D 
organization and the operative units. The drivers of innovation represent different forces 
which may be conflicting; scientists may be driven by an urge to explore an idea which builds 
heavily on accumulated knowledge, whereas the operative unit needs to find solutions to 
specific challenges. This tension may however be beneficial to innovative performance, as it 
 66 
represents a mixture of mature and new knowledge, which by Katila (2002) has been 
suggested to enhance innovation. 
 
7.1 Implications for Firm, Policy and Research? 
The analysis suggests implications for the company, policy, and further research, which is 
elaborated below. 
 
7.1.1 Strategies for StatoilHydro 
As the above findings indicate, practices that come out of the DUI and STI modes of learning 
and innovation are positively related to StatoilHydro’s ability to innovate. This suggests that 
the company might benefit from sustaining and developing these practices. Such development 
may for instance to a greater extent include non-R&D personnel in projects and different 
workgroups, or the other way around; facilitate the participation and rotation of R&D 
personnel in operative units. This would also serve as a possible strategy for searching 
StatoilHydro’s internal search space. Organizational integration is important to be able to 
communicate across intra-firm boundaries, and identify value. The tension between R&D and 
operative units may to some extent be reconciled through this, but it is suggested to maintain 
some of the tension, due to effects of mixing old and new knowledge, which is seen as 
enhancing innovation (Katila 2002). 
 
7.1.2 Implications for policy 
As mentioned above, one major finding is that the company relies heavily on both DUI and 
STI-mode knowledge and innovation. However, policies on innovation tend to focus 
predominantly on linear models of R&D and correspondingly give primacy to traditional 
R&D, i.e. the STI-mode of learning and innovation. This needs to be complemented by 
mechanisms to support organizational learning and user-driven innovation. The educational 
system emphasizes first and foremost codified and globalized knowledge, but has the 
potential of improved training of students in practices found mainly in the DUI-mode of 
learning and innovation. Problem-based learning, workgroups and assignments which 
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encourage interdisciplinary work may be examples of this. (Jensen et al 2007:690) Companies 
play an important part in the economy, as they synthesize knowledge and ideas from different 
sources and build specialized knowledge bases. This has positive extended effects on their 
surroundings. Should innovation policy mainly be occupied with the accommodation of 
education and research, and connecting companies through networks, or should it also make 
efforts towards building specialized knowledge by combining DUI and STI-modes of learning 
and innovation? The broad range of activities StatoilHydro engage in to develop their 
specialized knowledge bases, and their long term commitment to build knowledge in 
interaction with research institutions have positive effects on scientific knowledge bases. 
Scientific knowledge needs to be combined with the types of expertise and skill companies 
like StatoilHydro develop in order to create value. Building expertise and skill in private 
businesses is therefore important for commercialisation-purposes. Should this mutual 
interdependence be dealt with by innovation policy? An aspect of this might be how rules and 
regulations may provide market opportunities for such commercialisation. 
Further, institutions prescribing public policy which is relevant to innovation, such as 
ministries of education, science, industry and economic affairs may need to be delegated 
responsibility for balancing the two modes of learning and innovation. (Jensen et al 2007:690)  
Markets are influenced by regulations and standards, and these components, together with 
knowledge-development, should be seen as interdependent elements in a holistic policy of 
innovation. This means that the different institutions need to coordinate their efforts towards 
policy supporting innovation. The industrial sector StatoilHydro is part of engage in capital 
intensive products which require large-scale infrastructure, long time-horizons for making 
profit, and consequently large losses if the efforts fail. This point to what part the authorities 
might play in order to create incentives for innovation. The Mongstad test-centre has been put 
forward as an example of this. 
The White Paper on Innovation 2008-2009 demonstrate some efforts towards greater 
emphasis on DUI learning in the education system, first and foremost through reinforcing 
collaboration between education and working life, and on-the-job training. In addition 
emphasis is put on developing the industrial doctorates system, which may provide beneficial 
DUI and STI learning for both candidates and industry. The interdependence between 
industry-specific expertise and research centres producing scientific knowledge, with the 
purposes of commercialising research results is somewhat addressed, but the practical 
meaning of this intent remains unclear. The same is valid for how Norwegian Innovation 
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policy will actually deal with issues of responsibility between the different Ministries engaged 
in innovation policy. For instance, will reinforcement of on-the-job training be the sole 
responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Research, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
or should this be a joint effort between the two? And if so, how should this responsibility be 
divided? The White Paper on Innovation 2008-2009 provides several promising motives, but 
it remains to be seen how this will actually be carried out. 
 
7.1.3 Further research 
The STI and DUI-modes of learning and innovation provide a basic framework for analyzing 
organizational practices in a large company in the oil and gas sector. The framework has 
however demonstrated some shortcomings, specifically in terms of demonstrating extent and 
quality of such organizational practices. Search breadth and search depth has been presented 
as a complementary to the framework, as well as maturity of knowledge. However, 
combining all these dimensions are perhaps more fitting for case-specific research focusing 
on qualitative data, rather than large scale quantitative data-surveys. Future research on DUI 
and STI learning might for instance consider a possible combination of these dimensions. 
Working out a framework which takes into account dimensions of search and cooperation 
together with the other STI and DUI mode practices may be used qualitatively for 
comparative analyses of case-studies, or even for large scale quantitative surveys. It is also 
worth noting that the propositions put forward by Katila (2002) on maturity of knowledge are 
based on longitudinal data from the robotics industry, and that a similar study of the oil and 
gas industry may be useful to strengthen the validity of the propositions for the latter industry. 
Another issue for further research might be the development of a conceptual framework 
which considers environment/opportunity conditions in a broader sense. The concept of 
drivers of innovation adds standards, regulations and social demands as category which is 
influencing innovation through learning and knowledge development. The relations between 
opportunity conditions and regulations in the oil and gas industry need further research to 
unveil these mechanisms. 
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 Appendix I: Interview Guide for in-depth interviews 
 (based on themes and questions found in the project Managing Innovation in the New 
Economy, MINE) 
Interviewees are asked to offer their opinions on questions, themes and assertions put forward 
by the interviewer. Based on information coming up during the interview, some of the points 
may be skipped. 
 
BAKGRUNNEN FOR INNOVASJON I SEKTOREN 
a) Type kunder og deres behov, herunder: 
- hvorvidt de yter signifikant ekspertise om hvordan produktene som leveres fungerer 
- hvorvidt behovene for kunder i våre sektor er svært komplekse (og sammensatte) 
 
b)  Type og omfang av vitenskapelig og teknisk kunnskapsproduksjon, dvs. hvorvidt: 
- Egen sektor bidrar til akademisk forskning 
- Ny kunnskap er som regel et resultat av intens interaksjon mellom bedrifter 
- Ny teknologi bygger på den seneste teknologien fra andre bedrifter i sektoren 
- Alle firmaene i vår sektor avhenger av den samme stabile teknologiske basis 
 
c) Faktorer som påvirker innovasjon i din sektor: 
- Kommersialisering av nye produkter forutsetter godkjenning fra regulerende 
myndighet 
- Produkter må sammenkobles med andre produkter eller systemer for å ha verdi for 
kundene 
- Forbedring av produksjonsprosesser gir mye høyere gevinst enn produktinnovasjon 
 
d) Ressurstilgang og vekst i sektoren: 
- Myndighetene tildeler store ressurser for å støtte forskning og innovasjon 
- Innovative gründere har lett tilgang til finansiering (såkorn-penger, risikovillig kapital) 
 
e) Strategisk og konkurransemessig dynamikk i sektoren 
- Endringstakten i sektoren er svært rask sammenlignet med andre sektorer 
- Eksterne faktorer tvinger frem uforutsigbare forandringer i sektoren 
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BEDRIFTENS INNOVASJONSSTRATEGI 
1.  Kilder for konkurransedyktighet og overtak, viktighet siste fem år og kommende fem 
år: 
- Overlegen teknologi og ekspertise (know-how) 
- Sterkere organisatoriske evner 
- Bedre rykte hos kunder 
- Fordelaktige lover og reguleringer 
- Portefølje med verdifulle patenter og opphavsrettigheter 
- Større produksjons- og operasjonssystem 
- Bredere multinasjonalt omfang på firmaet 
 
2. Strategiske tiltak de siste fem år: 
a) Viktighet av konkurransemessige tiltak: 
- Være aggressiv på anskaffelse av nye foretak i vekstområder 
- Drive lobbyvirksomhet overfor myndigheter og påvirke opinionen for å få 
gjennomslag for egne syn 
- Være aggressiv i beskyttelsen av eget åndsverk (defensiv patentering, søksmål, etc.) 
- Leie de beste tilgjengelige forskere eller ekspert på markedet 
 
b) Viktighet av samarbeidstiltak: 
- Utvikle teknologiske veikart i samarbeid med andre firmaer for å redusere usikkerhet 
- Inngå kompaniskap med myndigheter og konkurrenter for å utvikle ny basisteknologi 
- Bygge strategiske allianser for å utvikle produkter og standarder 
- Hjelpe leverandører og oppstrømspartnere til å forbedre sine produkter, logistikk og 
service 
- Samarbeide med andre selskaper i arbeidsgrupper som utvikler standarder og normer 
- Hjelpe utviklingen av reguleringer og sertifiserings organer til å legitimere produkter 
 
3. Hyppighet i vurdering av antakelser som danner basis for strategi: 
- Hvem kundene er og hva de vil ha 
- Hva som er kjernemarkeder og inntektskilder (revenue streams) 
- Hva som er den beste blandingen av evner og kompetanse 
 
4.  Strategisk handling 
a) Det vesentligste ved det strategiske initiativet som foretas nå 
- Bygge en radikalt annerledes kilde for konkurransefortrinn 
- Styrke nåværende kilder for konkurransefortrinn 
 
c) Selskapets langsiktige strategiske perspektiv 
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- Det forsøkes å forutse mange steg fremover for å unngå å bli låst i en dårlig posisjon 
- Det utvikles flere parallelle strategiske veier og langsiktige alternativer proaktivt 
 
4.  Hvilken andel (hvor mange) av dem som jobber med innovasjon bruker følgende 
regler som en veileder for sine handlinger: 
- Formulere egen spesialisert kunnskap på måter som er forståelig for andre spesialiteter 
- Forstå temaer/problemer og betingelser innen andre funksjoner 
- Håndtere problemer som oppstår i innovasjonsprosjekter ved å utforske et mangfold 
av alternativer 
 
5. Formelle prosesser i selskapet for å ivareta: 
- læring fra tidligere prosjekter og overføring av lærdom til nye prosjekter 
- at ulike funksjoner lærer fra hverandre 
- vurdering og forbedring av kapasiteter in teknologi, ny produktutvikling, 
markedsføring etc. 
 
6. Påstander om innovasjon i firmaet: 
b)  Identifisering og utvikling av kapasiteter for innovasjon: vitenskapelig, ingeniørskap, 
markedsføring, produksjon/fremstillings ekspertise, innovasjonsprosesser, 
informasjonssystemer: 
- Nye kapasiteter kommer frem før vi vet hvordan de kan anvendes til produkter 
- Folk som bygger vitenskapelige og ingeniørmessige kapasiteter velger hva som skal 
utvikles, innen strategiske retningslinjer 
 
c)  Ledelse av forretningsenheter for innovasjon: innarbeide nye produkter mot 
forretningsmodeller, gi nytt liv til forretningene via innovasjon, oppsyn med 
porteføljer og prioriteringer: 
- produkter 
- BU ledere holder FoU informert om nye funksjonaliteter som behøves i produkter 
- BU ledere har frihet til å avgjøre hvordan innovasjonsstrategien skal gjennomføres 
 
d) Ledelse av nye produktutviklingsprosjekter(NPD): 
- NPD team bestemmer selv hvordan produktkonseptet skal defineres, innen strategiske 
retningslinjer 
- Det samme teamet kontrollerer hele NPD prosessen, fra definisjon til 
kommersialisering 
 
 
 77 
SELSKAPETS INNOVASJONSNETTVERK 
1. Selskapets posisjonering i verdiskapingsnettverk; et selskap forsøker å posisjonere 
seg selv i et nettverk av verdiskapingsaktiviteter i en sektor ved å definere sin egen 
verdiskapingsrolle i relasjon til andre organisasjoner i nettverket: 
Vurder påstandene: 
- Informasjon og databaser stilles til rådighet for selskaper engasjert i innovativ aktivitet 
- Spesialiserte tjenester og rådgivning gjøres tilgjengelig for firmaer engasjert i 
innovativ aktivitet 
- Selskapet er en system-integrator – subsystemer som er produsert av andre brukes til å 
skape produkter 
- Komplekse systemer tilpasses for å fungere i bruksområdene til spesifikke kunder 
 
FREMGANGSMÅTER SOM BRUKES FOR Å HÅNDTERE INNOVASJON 
1. Fremgangsmåter for søk: hvordan uforske nye muligheter for innovasjon og lete etter 
nye ideer: 
- Opprettholde langsiktige interne programmer for oppdagelse av nye teknologier 
- Avhengighet av interne kapasiteter for å oppdage markedstrender 
- Flytting av personale fra enhet til enhet for å oppnå berikelse av ideer fra flere steder 
- Ansatte får tid og ressurser til å utvikle nye ideer 
- Vi samhandler med nøkkelleverandører og kunder for å få kunnskap om utviklingen 
på feltet 
- Selskapet deltar i industri-nettverk (foreninger, konferanser, standardiserings-komiteer 
etc.) 
- Selskapet samhandler med mange universitet spin-offs for å identifisere radikalt nye 
ideer 
 
2. Håndtering av innovasjons-porteføljen: 
- Selskapet har en strukturert tilnærming med seleksjonskomiteer på ulike nivåer 
- Mange uoffisielle prosjekter støttes for å utfordre den nåværende strategien 
- Mellomledere har frihet til å omfordele økonomiske midler innen en totalpakke for 
innovasjon 
 
3. Innovasjonsprosjekter som nylig er avsluttet: 
- Innovasjonene er kombinasjoner av ideer fra tidligere prosjekter 
- Vi drar ofte nytte av kunnskap som i utgangspunktet ble produsert for et annet 
anvendelsesområde 
- Det er omfattende gjenbruk av plattformer og moduler selskapet har utviklet før 
- Representanter fra nøkkelkunder blir svært tidlig integrert i utviklingsgruppen 
- Vi forsøker å dra stor fordel av leverandørers erfaringer i innovasjonsprosjektene 
- Flere konsepter utvikles og testes parallelt før et produktkonsept velges 
- Vi går igjennom mange skrittvise tilnærminger som fullstendig redefinerer konseptet 
og arkitekturen 
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- Så tidlig som mulig blir nøkkelkunder bedt om å teste prototypen og gi 
tilbakemeldinger 
 
4. Kommersialiseringspraksis: kommersialisering som tar sikte på å fange verdier fra 
innovasjon 
- Et strategisk rammeverk anvendes for å avgjøre de beste tilnærmingene til 
kommersialisering 
- FoU må finne de beste måtene å kommersialisere innovasjoner internt eller eksternt 
- Vi har en ny innsatsgruppe (venture group) som spesialiserer seg på utvikling av nye 
interne forretningsemheter 
- Vi har en policy på å oppmuntre til spinouts ledet av eget personell 
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Appendix II: Interview Guide for informal interviews with innovators 
1. Hvordan oppsto ideen? 
Var det et uttalt behov fra driftsmiljøet? 
Hvordan var første reaksjon på ideen, og kommunikasjonen rundt dette før peer review? 
Hvordan ble et første søk etter relevant informasjon, kunnskap, forskning gjort? 
Hva med ideer fra messer, nettverk, konferanser? 
Technology Watch? 
Ble Goldfire brukt? Hvordan? 
Var det kontakt med forskningsinstitutter, universiteter? 
 
2. Hvordan foregikk peer review? 
Type eksperter? 
Hva ble sagt der om veien videre? 
 
3. Hvordan foregikk samarbeid med driftsenheter? 
-pilotering? 
-utveksling av erfaringer fra drift? 
 
4. Var det samarbeid med leverandører? 
 På hvilket punkt i utviklingen? 
-Hvordan foregikk dette? 
 
5. Implementering? 
- Hvor, hvordan, vurdering av suksess i etterkant? 
Div: 
Kommunikasjon på tvers av disipliner? Evne til formulering av problemstillinger? 
Vurdering av alternative løsninger for problemet? 
Styrker/svakheter ved måten prosessen foregikk, fra idé til implementering? Ift. søk, selve 
prosessen, kommunikasjon, ledelsesstrategier etc. 
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Appendix III: Guide for observation of Innovation Café 
 
1. Hvem er deltakerne? 
- Faglig bakgrunn 
- Antall 
- Hvor i StatoilHydro hører de til 
 
2. Hvem prater med hvem? 
- Hvordan blandes deltakerne ift. bakgrunn 
- Hvilke retningslinjer følger man for dette 
 
3. Hva slags utfordringer/løsninger snakkes det om? 
- Ideer fra F-miljø 
- Utfordringer fra driftsmiljø 
- Har F-miljø utfordringer driftsmiljø kan bidra til å løse? 
- Har driftsmiljø ideer F-miljø kan utvikle videre? 
 
4. Hvordan organiseres treffet? 
- Strukturering av ulike undertemaer/ideer/utfordringer? 
- Ulike faser? Dvs. når man kan diskutere, når man kan presentere, når man kommer 
med feedback til de ulike temaer/ideer 
- Hvem snakker mest? Om hva?  
- Snakker man samme ”språk”? 
- DUI vs. STI? 
 
5. Hva skjer etterpå? 
- Hvem følger opp resultatene av treffet 
- Hvordan skjer dette 
- Hvordan kommuniseres resultatene til ulike miljøer innen StatoilHydro 
